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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Monitoring recognition memory: A signal detection analysis of internally and 
externally generated influences on discriminability and response bias 
 
by 
 
Brent M. Wilson 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
 
University of California, San Diego, 2017 
 
Professor John T. Wixted, Chair 
 
 
This dissertation contributes to a growing body of research that attempts 
to bridge the chasm between basic and applied memory research. Its basic 
approach is to use signal detection theory to analyze higher-level cognitive 
components that influence recognition memory.  The work consists of three 
research papers that examine the effects of internal and external sources of 
memory on discriminability and response bias in order to better understand 
memory in the real world.  Paper one provides new evidence supporting a basic 
assumption of reality-monitoring theory that certain cognitive operations are 
important for knowing whether or not a memory comes from an internal source.  
 	 xiii	
This research demonstrates that people are more susceptible to false memories 
after completing mindfulness training because their reality-monitoring accuracy is 
reduced.  Paper two examines the verbal overshadowing effect (where people 
are worse at correctly identifying someone from a police lineup after providing a 
verbal description of a face) with receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis 
to determine if that well-known effect is due to differences in actual memorability 
rather than differences in response bias.  This research indicates that internally-
generated information can be confused with an external memory source when 
the internally-generated information is not sufficiently detailed.  Paper three 
examines the cross-race effect wherein memory is worse for a person of a 
different race than a person of the same race.  This research indicates that 
although memory is worse in terms of discriminability, high-confidence 
identifications are just as reliable for a cross-race face as for a same-race face.
  1 
	
CHAPTER 1	
Introduction to the Dissertation 
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 Memory research is often sharply divided into two broad types: basic and 
applied.  Basic memory research attempts to understand how memory works and 
focuses on testing specific models of memory.  Applied memory research, on the 
other hand, focuses on how memory operates in the real world but often 
disregards well-developed memory models from basic research.  My dissertation 
attempts to bridge the chasm between basic and applied memory research by 
using signal detection theory to examine higher-level cognitive components that 
influence memory.  Its main contribution consists of three research papers that 
use a model testing approach based on signal detection theory to better 
understand memory in the real world.   
 Even though the use of signal detection theory to interpret recognition 
memory data is often absent from applied research that examines memory in the 
real world, it is standard practice in basic memory research.  Signal detection 
theory is important for ensuring that a particular measure of accuracy is actually 
answering the question researchers want to know (Rotello, Heit, & Dubé, 2015).  
In particular, whereas intuitively plausible measures of accuracy typically conflate 
discriminability (the ability to distinguish between two states of the world) and 
response bias (the tendency to choose one response option over the other), 
signal detection theory separates these separate processes into separate 
measures.   
 When discriminability and response bias are not separately assessed, an 
experimental manipulation that affects response bias without affecting 
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discriminability can create the false impression that memory differs across the 
two conditions.  For example, a difference in response bias can be observed 
when an eyewitness is asked to identify a suspect in a police lineup.  If 
eyewitnesses in one condition are led to believe that it is important to avoid 
falsely identifying an innocent person, this will likely result in a more conservative 
response bias compared to the other condition.  The change in response bias will 
affect an intuitive accuracy measure (e.g., percent correct will differ across 
conditions) without actually affecting the ability of eyewitnesses to discriminate 
innocent from guilty suspects.  A signal detection analysis would reveal that 
response bias was affected by the experimental manipulation whereas 
discriminability remained unchanged.   
 Usually the question of interest is whether or not an experimental 
manipulation influences discriminability.  Inducing people to change their 
response bias in one direction or the other (using instructions) is usually easier 
than actually improving discriminability.  Improving discriminability (not changing 
response bias) is the goal of most applied research on memory.  The reason is 
that if discriminability is increased, then the two types of errors that occur on 
recognition memory tasks – misidentifying an item as having been seen before 
when it was not and failing to identify an item as having been seen before when it 
was – can be minimized.  Different measures of accuracy, however, often 
conflate these two aspects of memory performance making it difficult or 
impossible to tell exactly what effect a particular manipulation is having. 
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 In the context of memory, discriminability theoretically refers to the overlap 
of two distributions that represent the memory strengths associated with the test 
items.  In most situations (and in all of those in my dissertation) these two 
distributions are the target distribution and the foil distribution.  These memory-
strength distributions represent the subjective “evidence values” upon which 
recognition decisions are based.  The target distribution is the distribution of 
evidence values for items that were actually encountered on an earlier study list.  
The foil distribution is the distribution of evidence values for items that were not 
encountered on an earlier study list.  If these distributions happened to be 
completely overlapping in a particular condition, the target and foil distributions 
would overlap and discriminability would be zero.  An example can be seen in 
Figure 1.1.  At the other extreme, if these distributions were fully separated with 
virtually no overlap between the target and foil distributions, discriminability would 
be extremely high (i.e., responding would be essentially error-free).  An example 
of near-perfect discriminability is illustrated in Figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.1. Distribution of evidence values for zero discriminability. 
 
Figure 1.2. Distribution of evidence values for infinitely high discriminability. 
 
 For a given test item, a decision about whether or not the item is a target 
or a foil is made by first setting a decision criterion on the strength-of-evidence 
axis.  The concept of discriminability is not dependent on where a person places 
a particular decision criterion.  The placement of the decision criterion is not fixed 
but is determined by the participant’s response bias.  In some situations people 
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may have a liberal response bias (where the decision criterion is far to the left).  
Figure 1.3 shows an example of a liberal decision criterion for one particular level 
of discriminability.  In other situations people may have a conservative response 
bias (where the decision criterion is far to the right).  Figure 1.4 shows an 
example of a conservative decision criterion for the same level of discriminability 
in Figure 1.3.  
 
Figure 1.3. Example of a liberal decision criterion for one particular level of 
discriminability.   
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Figure 1.4. Example of a conservative decision criterion for the same level of 
discriminability shown in Figure 1.3.   
 
 Signal detection theory has been used for decades to conceptualize 
recognition memory decisions on laboratory tasks designed to test cognitive 
models, and it is equally relevant for recognition decisions on laboratory tasks 
designed to test questions about memory in the real world.  In my dissertation, I 
use signal detection theory to better understand real-world memory.  My first 
paper demonstrates that people are more susceptible to false memories after 
completing mindfulness training because their reality-monitoring accuracy is 
reduced.  My second paper examines the verbal overshadowing effect (where 
people are worse at correctly identifying someone from a police lineup after 
providing a verbal description) with receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
analysis to see if the effect in previous research is due to differences in actual 
memorability (i.e., discriminability) rather than differences in response bias.  My 
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third paper examines the cross-race effect wherein memory is worse for a person 
of a different race than a person of the same race.  Although memory is worse, 
high-confidence identifications may be equally reliable for a cross-race and 
same-race faces. 
 As noted above, my first paper uses signal detection theory to understand 
how mindfulness meditation affects “reality-monitoring” (Johnson & Raye, 1981; 
Johnson, Raye, Foley, & Foley, 1981; Lindsay, 2008).  Reality monitoring refers 
to the processes people rely on to determine if a memory exists because the 
experience actually happened in the real world or because it was imagined as 
happening.  Mindfulness meditation focuses attention on the present moment 
without judgment or evaluation (Bishop et al., 2004).  Categorizing and 
evaluating information during encoding is one of the ways people are able to later 
differentiate internal and external memories.  Mindfulness, therefore, seems like 
a promising way of attenuating one of the important cues that allows people to 
know that something was not actually encountered in the real world, namely 
cognitive operations.   
 Theoretically, when people themselves generate information (when they 
imagine it, rather than actually encountering it in the real world) they leave a 
trace record that helps them later know this information was internally generated.  
This trace record reflects the outcome of a judgment process (the judgment 
being “this is information I just imagined”), which might be eliminated through the 
use of mindfulness meditation.  The essence of mindfulness meditation is to 
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simply observe whatever comes to mind without judgment (i.e., without 
performing cognitive operations).    
 Signal detection theory provides a model to clearly conceptualize what 
memories from the real world should look like and what memories not from the 
real world (i.e., internally generated) should look like.  Rather than being an all-
or-nothing process, as high-threshold models assume (see Green & Swets, 
1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005), a signal detection account of reality 
monitoring assumes that memories exist on a continuum ranging from memories 
that generate a strong sense of having been externally generated to memories 
that generate a strong sense of having been internally generated.  If memories 
were clearly tagged as being one or the other, it would be unlikely that 
mindfulness meditation would have the ability to entirely change such a strong 
difference.  However, if memories instead have various traces associated with 
them that make them look more or less internal or external, a manipulation like 
mindfulness meditation may be able to have the effect of changing the traces 
associated with memories just enough that it is harder to tell in which category a 
particular memory belongs.   
 After exploring how people determine whether or not a memory is actually 
from the real world (i.e., externally generated), I turn in my second paper to an 
important line of research that results in potential confusion between actual real-
world experience and later internal generations of that experience.  Previous 
research has examined whether or not verbally describing the face of a 
  
10 
perpetrator impairs later memory for that perpetrator.  A verbal description that is 
internally generated by an eyewitness may interfere with the actual, real-world 
memory of the perpetrator.  However, previous research (e.g., Schooler & 
Engstler-Schooler, 1990; Alogna et al. 2014) was not conducted using a signal 
detection approach, and the measures of accuracy that were used conflated 
discriminability and response bias.  In order to have evidence that internally-
generated descriptions of a perpetrator interfere with the memory representation 
of the perpetrator actually encountered in the real world, discriminability would 
need to be lower after providing a verbal description.  
 To determine if providing an internally-generated verbal description of a 
face makes the target and foil distributions harder to differentiate, I use receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) analysis.  ROC analysis clearly differentiates 
between differences in discriminability and response bias unlike the measures of 
accuracy used in previous research investigating this topic.  In addition to 
examining the theoretical implications of providing a verbal description using 
ROC analysis, I explore the applied implications by calculating how likely a high-
confidence identification is to be accurate if a verbal description has or has not 
been provided.   
 One of the advantages of using signal detection theory to inform research 
is that it helps to clarify if the result being reported actually addresses the 
question of interest.  Signal detection theory does not only apply a set of tools in 
which to plug data and calculate a measure of discriminability; it also provides a 
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way to conceptualize how distributions can move independently of the decision 
criterion.  Even previous research that used signal detection theory to measure 
discriminability made erroneous conclusions about the effect of an experimental 
manipulation because the reported measures do not appropriately answer the 
actual question of interest.  In other words, although discriminability is usually the 
measures of interest, in some key cases, it is not the measure of interest. This is 
the primary problem I address in my third paper.   
 My third paper examines whether or not people are able to appropriately 
adjust their high-confidence decision criterion in a situation where their memory 
of a perpetrator is likely to be worse.  Much previous research has examined the 
cross-race effect wherein people have worse memory for faces of different races 
than faces of the same race (Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Meissner & Brigham, 
2001; Sporer, 2001).  In signal detection terms, this means the target and foil 
distributions overlap more for cross-race identifications than same-race 
identifications.  Previous research has stopped there and has failed to answer 
the primary real-world question.  Are identifications made with high confidence 
less accurate (less reliable) for cross-race than same-race faces?  A measure of 
discriminability does not answer this question, but the field has believed 
otherwise for decades. 
 Signal detection theory provides the insight that the decision criterion can 
move independently of the distributions.  This means that even if the target and 
foil distributions overlap more for cross-race identifications than same-race 
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identifications, high-confidence accuracy will not necessarily be lower for cross-
race identifications than same-race identifications.  This is a situation where the 
question of interest involves integrating the knowledge that distributions can 
move and the knowledge that the decision criterion can also move, and it 
illustrates the fact that signal detection theory is most important for framing the 
question of interest (i.e., it is not simply a toolbox of statistics).   
 These three papers in total enhance understanding of memory in the real 
world by using signal detection theory to clarify and inform the appropriate 
question of interest.  I first examine how people are able to figure out if 
something is actually from the real world and how internally-generated 
representations can make this challenging.  I then examine a specific real-world 
challenge for the legal system wherein an internally-generated verbal 
representation can interfere with the real-world representation of a face.  Finally, I 
examine if people are able to set their decision criterion appropriately high in 
situations where target and foil distributions are more overlapping because the 
memory is of a cross-race face. 
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Research Article
The concept of mindfulness is pervasive in both popular 
culture and academic research. Oprah Winfrey, Deepak 
Chopra, and Dr. Oz (The Dr. Oz Show, 2013) have all 
extolled the merits of being mindful, and scholarly stud-
ies have investigated the benefits of this phenomenon. 
Mindfulness-based interventions for both physical and 
psychological disorders have been reported, and these 
include reduced pain intensity for patients with chronic 
pain (Reiner, Tibi, & Lipsitz, 2013), improved psychologi-
cal well-being (Brown & Ryan, 2003), reduced levels of 
stress and anxiety (Astin, 1997; Jain et  al., 2007; 
Rosenzweig, Reibel, Greeson, Brainard, & Hojat, 2003; 
Shapiro, Schwartz, & Bonner, 1998), and decreased 
depression in older adults (Geschwind, Peeters, Drukker, 
van Os, & Wichers, 2011). Mindfulness meditation focuses 
attention on the present moment in an accepting and 
nonjudgmental manner (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; 
Brown & Ryan, 2003; Kabat-Zinn, 2013). Each thought, 
feeling, and sensation is acknowledged and accepted 
without judgment or evaluation (Bishop et  al., 2004; 
Kabat-Zinn, 2013; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2012; 
Teasdale, 1999). As Kabat-Zinn (2013) noted, “the prac-
tice involves suspending judgment and just watching 
whatever [emphasis in original] comes up” (p. 23).
In contrast to the myriad benefits of mindfulness, it 
may also increase false-memory susceptibility by affecting 
the cognitive operations needed to distinguish between 
internal and external sources of information. According to 
the source-monitoring framework, false memories occur 
because of a failure to distinguish the origin of a memory 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 2008). 
When the origin of a memory is misattributed, informa-
tion from one context is falsely remembered as having 
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Abstract
The effect of mindfulness meditation on false-memory susceptibility was examined in three experiments. Because 
mindfulness meditation encourages judgment-free thoughts and feelings, we predicted that participants in the 
mindfulness condition would be especially likely to form false memories. In two experiments, participants were 
randomly assigned to either a mindfulness induction, in which they were instructed to focus attention on their 
breathing, or a mind-wandering induction, in which they were instructed to think about whatever came to mind. 
The overall number of words from the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm that were correctly recalled did not 
differ between conditions. However, participants in the mindfulness condition were significantly more likely to report 
critical nonstudied items than participants in the control condition. In a third experiment, which tested recognition 
and used a reality-monitoring paradigm, participants had reduced reality-monitoring accuracy after completing the 
mindfulness induction. These results demonstrate a potential unintended consequence of mindfulness meditation in 
which memories become less reliable.
Keywords
false memories, mindfulness, Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, source monitoring, reality monitoring, 
signal detection theory
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been part of a different context. Source-monitoring errors 
can arise as a consequence of confusing memory sources. 
Confusion can occur between two external sources as 
well as between an internally generated source and an 
external one (Johnson et al., 1993).
Reality monitoring is the process of discriminating 
between internally generated and external memory 
sources ( Johnson & Raye, 1981). Information that people 
generate themselves is usually associated with cognitive 
operations (i.e., mental processes involved in the genera-
tion of information) that leave a trace and later provide 
cues that the information was internally generated rather 
than actually encountered in the external world ( Johnson, 
Raye, Foley, & Foley, 1981; Lindsay, 2008). If focusing 
mindful attention without judgment results in the suspen-
sion of cognitive operations (and thus the elimination of 
the trace records those operations would otherwise 
leave), people will have greater difficulty differentiating 
internal and external sources of information. That is, 
mindfulness training might increase the risk for false 
memories because internally generated memories would 
lack the cues that are ordinarily used to help identify 
them as having been internally generated.
In the first two experiments, we examined the effect of 
mindfulness meditation on false-memory susceptibility 
using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm 
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The DRM is the paradigm 
most widely used to test false memories (Brainerd & 
Reyna, 2005). The procedure involves presenting lists of 
closely related words and then testing memory with 
either recall or recognition. For each list, there is a word 
(the critical item) that is closely related to the words on 
the list but is not on the list. The critical item is strongly 
activated by the other words on the list, and it can be 
falsely remembered if people mistake this strong internal 
activation for an actual memory of the word. For exam-
ple, the word list garbage, waste, can, refuse, sewage, 
bag, junk, rubbish, sweep, scraps, pile, dump, landfill, 
debris, and litter can activate the critical item trash (list 
from Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001).
In the third experiment, we used a reality-monitoring 
paradigm and extended the research to recognition 
memory. If increases in false memories after mindfulness 
training are due to reduced reality-monitoring abilities, 
participants will have reduced abilities to discriminate 
between words actually studied and words internally 
activated during study but not actually presented.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. One hundred fifty-three undergraduate 
students (37 male, 116 female; mean age = 20.7 years, 
SD = 2.4) at the University of California, San Diego, par-
ticipated in this experiment for course credit. We planned 
to recruit as many participants as possible before the end 
of the quarter.
Materials and procedure. Participants sat in individ-
ual sound-attenuated rooms and were randomly assigned 
to receive either a 15-min mindfulness induction or a 
15-min mind-wandering induction. In the mindfulness 
induction, participants listened to a guided focused-
breathing exercise recorded by Marilee Bresciani Ludvik 
at the Rushing to Yoga Foundation. This mindfulness 
induction was based on a script by Arch and Craske 
(2006) that had been adapted from work by Kabat-Zinn 
(1990). It instructed participants to focus attention on 
their breathing without judgment. The mind-wandering 
induction, also recorded by Marilee Bresciani Ludvik, 
instructed participants to think about whatever came to 
mind. Mind wandering has been used as a control condi-
tion in other mindfulness experiments to represent a 
neutral mental state (e.g., Hafenbrack, Kinias, & Barsade, 
2014; Kiken & Shook, 2011).
All participants were then shown the DRM word list 
for the critical item trash (Roediger et  al., 2001). Each 
word was presented in the center of the computer screen 
for 1.5 s. After all 15 words were presented, participants 
immediately typed as many words as they could 
remember.
Results
Participants in the mindfulness condition were signifi-
cantly more likely to falsely remember seeing the word 
trash, 39%, 95% confidence interval, or CI = [29.15%, 
49.46%], than those in the mind-wandering condition, 
20%, 95% CI = [12.37%, 31.35%], z = 2.48, p = .014, 
Cohen’s d = 0.50, 95% CI = [0.18, 0.82]. The mean number 
of correctly recalled words did not significantly differ 
between the mindfulness condition, 7.02, 95% CI = [6.68, 
7.37], and the mind-wandering condition, 6.75, 95% CI = 
[6.35, 7.15], t(152) = 1.02, p > .250. For each list, we num-
bered the recalled words according to the order in which 
they were recalled. The average position number at 
which the critical item was reported did not differ signifi-
cantly between the mindfulness condition (6.3) and the 
mind-wandering condition (6.1), t(45) = 0.2, p > .250. The 
average number of other words falsely recalled did not 
significantly differ between the mindfulness condition 
(0.34) and the mind-wandering condition (0.29), t(152) = 
0.45, p > .250.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants. One hundred forty undergraduate stu-
dents (40 male, 100 female; mean age = 21.5 years, 
SD  =  4.3) at the University of California, San Diego, 
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participated in this experiment for course credit. Using 
our effect size from Experiment 1, we estimated that we 
would need 128 participants to have 80% power to detect 
a statistically significant difference. We planned to recruit 
as many participants as possible before the end of the 
quarter, but the minimum was 128 participants.
Materials and procedure. Participants sat in individ-
ual sound-attenuated rooms. Six (preinduction) DRM 
word lists (critical items: mountain, music, thief, doctor, 
cold, needle) from Roediger et al. (2001) were presented 
in random order. Each word was presented in the center 
of the computer screen for 1.5 s. After viewing each list, 
participants immediately typed as many words as they 
could remember.
After the six lists were completed, the computer ran-
domly assigned participants to either the mindfulness 
condition or the mind-wandering condition. The induc-
tions were those used in Experiment 1. Participants then 
completed a different set of six postinduction DRM word 
lists (critical items: lamp, trash, slow, wish, foot, window) 
also from Roediger et  al. (2001) presented in random 
order.1 Each word was presented in the center of the 
computer screen for 1.5 s. Again, after viewing each list, 
participants immediately typed as many words as they 
could remember.
Results
In the within-subjects comparison, participants in the 
mindfulness condition were significantly more likely to 
falsely recall the critical items after the induction than 
before the induction, t(67) = 2.75, p = .008, Cohen’s d = 
0.33, 95% CI = [0.09, 0.58]. Participants in the mind- 
wandering condition showed no difference in critical-item 
recall on the preinduction and postinduction lists, t(71) < 
0.001, p > .250, Cohen’s d = 0.00, 95% CI = [0, 0]. The same 
results were also found in the between-subjects compari-
son. Participants in the mindfulness condition were sig-
nificantly more likely to falsely recall the critical item, M = 
.34, 95% CI = [.29, .38], than were participants in the mind-
wandering condition, M = .26, 95% CI = [.21, .31], t(138) = 
2.27, p = .025, Cohen’s d = 0.38, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.72]. This 
difference remained significant when we controlled for 
participants’ baseline levels of false-memory susceptibility 
and memory performance using the average critical-item 
recall and proportion correct during preinduction, F(1, 
136) = 5.78, p = .018. We performed a 2 × 2 analysis of 
variance and found a significant interaction between con-
dition (mindfulness vs. mind-wandering) and time of 
recall (preinduction vs. postinduction), F(1, 138) = 4.22, 
p = .042. Figure 1 shows the average proportion of critical 
items falsely recalled as being included on the preinduc-
tion and postinduction word lists.
The average proportion of words correctly recalled 
did not differ significantly between conditions (mindful-
ness: M = .46, 95% CI = [.44, .49]; mind-wandering: M = 
.45, 95% CI = [.43, .48]), t(138) = 0.66, p > .250, Cohen’s 
d = 0.11, 95% CI = [−0.22, 0.44]. The proportion correct 
was not significantly different even after we controlled 
for both correct identifications and critical-item recall on 
the preinduction lists, F(1, 136) = 1.66, p = .200. 
Participants in the two conditions did not significantly 
differ in critical-item recall (p > .250) or correct recall (p > 
.250) on the DRM lists completed before receiving the 
audio inductions. Again, for each list, we numbered the 
recalled words according to the order in which they were 
recalled. The average position number at which the criti-
cal item was reported did not differ significantly between 
the mindfulness condition (5.7) and the mind-wandering 
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Fig. 1. Average proportion of critical items falsely recalled as being included on 
the preinduction and postinduction word lists in the mind-wandering (control) and 
mindfulness conditions. Error bars represent ±1 SE.
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condition (5.2), t(119) = 1.60, p = .111, and did not change 
significantly after participants completed the mindfulness 
induction (5.4 for preinduction and 5.7 for postinduc-
tion), t(50) = 0.55, p > .250. The average number of other 
words falsely recalled did not differ significantly between 
the mindfulness condition (0.22) and the mind-wander-
ing condition (0.18), t(138) = 0.96, p > .250, and did not 
change after participants completed the mindfulness 
induction (0.22 for both preinduction and postinduction), 
t(67) = 0, p > .250.
Discussion
These results provide evidence that false-memory sus-
ceptibility increases after completing mindfulness train-
ing. The pretest-posttest design of this experiment (as 
opposed to the design of Experiment 1) also provides 
evidence that false-memory susceptibility is increased by 
mindfulness training rather than being decreased by 
mind wandering. In the next experiment, we extend this 
work to a reality-monitoring paradigm (Brainerd & Reyna, 
2005) to better identify why false memories increase after 
mindfulness meditation training.
Experiment 3
Method
Participants. Two hundred fifteen undergraduate stu-
dents (59 male, 156 female; mean age = 20.3 years, 
SD = 2.9) at the University of California, San Diego, par-
ticipated in this experiment for course credit. On the 
basis of the effect size from our within-subjects compari-
son in Experiment 2, we estimated that we would need 
75 participants to have 80% power to detect a statistically 
significant difference. We planned to recruit as many par-
ticipants as possible before the end of the quarter, but 
the minimum was 75 participants.
Materials and procedure. Two hundred pairs of 
strongly associated words (e.g., foot-shoe, sediment-fossil) 
were constructed using databases of word associations 
(Palermo & Jenkins, 1964; Rotmistrov, 2014). One hun-
dred word pairs were randomly selected for the prein-
duction study and test phase. The remaining 100 word 
pairs were then used for the postinduction study and test 
phase.
Participants sat in individual sound-attenuated rooms. 
During the preinduction study phase, 1 word from each 
pair was randomly selected and presented in the center 
of the computer screen for 1.5 s. The 100 words were 
presented in random order. After all the words had been 
presented to participants, the preinduction test phase 
began immediately. One word from each pair was ran-
domly selected for the test phase and presented in the 
center of the computer screen. This procedure gave each 
word an equal probability of being a target or a lure. 
Participants identified whether the word had appeared 
on the word list (“old”) or had not appeared on the word 
list (“new”) and indicated their level of confidence in 
each answer.
All participants then listened to the 15-min mindful-
ness induction used in the first two experiments. After 
completing the mindfulness induction, participants began 
the postinduction study phase followed immediately by 
the postinduction test phase. The procedure was identi-
cal to that in the preinduction study and test phase.
Results
We used d′ (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) to compare 
how well participants were able to discriminate between 
externally presented (old or target) items and internally 
generated (new or lure) items. Accuracy (d′) was signifi-
cantly higher for the word lists studied and tested before 
the mindfulness induction (M = 1.60, SD = 0.71) than for 
the word lists studied and tested after the mindfulness 
induction (M = 1.42, SD = 0.79), t(214) = 4.08, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 0.28, 95% CI = [0.14, 0.41]. With regard to the 
proportion of words declared to be “old,” there was a 
significant interaction between the status of the word 
(internal vs. external) and condition (control vs. mindful-
ness), F(1, 214) = 20.94, p < .001. The false alarm rate 
increased significantly after participants completed the 
mindfulness induction (before: M = .20, SD = .15; after: 
M = .25, SD = .18), t(214) = 4.49, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 
0.31, 95% CI = [0.17, 0.44], but the hit rate did not change 
significantly (before: M = .72, SD = .15; after: M = .71, 
SD = .16), t(214) = 1.55, p = .123, Cohen’s d = 0.11, 95% 
CI = [−0.03, 0.24]. Because null-hypothesis significance 
testing cannot provide evidence in favor of the null, we 
also calculated the Jeffreys-Zellner-Siow (JZS) Bayes fac-
tor for the nonsignificant change in the hit rate (Rouder, 
Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). This method 
gave 5.65:1 odds in favor of the null hypothesis.
We used c (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) to measure 
response bias. Participants had a significantly more liberal 
response bias (i.e., more of the distribution exceeded the 
criterion line) after completing the mindfulness induction 
(before: M = 0.15, SD = 0.40; after: M = 0.085, SD = 0.47), 
t(214) = 2.61, p = .0097, Cohen’s d = 0.18, 95% CI = [0.04, 
0.31]. However, it is important to note that a change in 
measured bias does not necessarily entail a change in 
participants’ decision strategy (Wixted & Stretch, 2000).
Discussion
The results of Experiment 3 are consistent with the results 
from Experiments 1 and 2 and provide additional evi-
dence that mindfulness training increased false-memory 
susceptibility. Experiment 3 also extends the findings to 
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recognition memory and to a reality-monitoring para-
digm. These findings support the idea that the increase in 
false memories is due to a reduction in reality-monitoring 
accuracy. Each word on the study list strongly activates 
its paired word. Participants are less accurate at discrimi-
nating between associated words (internally generated) 
and words actually studied (external memory source) 
after completing the mindfulness induction.
General Discussion
Our research adds to and connects the literature on 
mindfulness meditation and false memories. Whereas the 
preponderance of research on mindfulness has focused 
on the beneficial aspects of this phenomenon (Chiesa, 
Calati, & Serretti, 2011), our study examines a potential 
adverse effect. When meditators embrace judgment-free 
awareness and acceptance, their reality-monitoring accu-
racy may be impaired, increasing their susceptibility to 
false memories.
Information encountered in the external world is 
expected to leave a trace record that contains greater 
sensory detail than information that is internally gener-
ated, and this difference in sensory content is one factor 
that facilitates the discrimination between internally and 
externally generated information. Johnson et al. (1981) 
also noted the importance of a second factor: cognitive 
operations associated with the internal generation of 
information at the time of encoding. At retrieval, a trace 
record of those cognitive operations ordinarily helps to 
identify internally generated information as having been 
internally generated. However, the nonjudgmental aspect 
of mindfulness meditation may be expected to reduce 
this important cue. The essential idea of mindfulness 
meditation is to observe without judgment or reaction 
(rather than performing cognitive operations on) what-
ever comes to mind. The elimination of cognitive opera-
tions would therefore have the effect of also eliminating 
a trace record of such operations that might otherwise 
help to discriminate between internally and externally 
generated information on a later memory test. The result 
would be a decreased ability to discriminate between 
sources of information ( Johnson & Raye, 1981), thereby 
increasing susceptibility to the DRM false-memory effect.
This argument can be illustrated using a simple signal 
detection model of a task in which the participant’s goal 
is to discriminate between internally generated (new) 
and externally presented (old) information (as in 
Experiment 3). The x-axis in the model shown in Figure 2 
ranges from strong evidence that a test item was inter-
nally generated (at the far left) to strong evidence that the 
test item was externally presented (at the far right). The 
distribution of evidence values for internally generated 
items in the control condition falls farther to the left than 
the distribution of evidence values for externally pre-
sented items. The difference between the two distribu-
tions is d′.
As noted earlier, this discrimination is facilitated both 
by the sensory content of the memory trace (more 
detailed for externally presented items than for internally 
generated items) and by the record of cognitive opera-
tions associated with the generation of internally gener-
ated items. Thus, for example, a test item that falls to the 
far left (a strong evidence trace for internal generation) 
might be associated with limited sensory content as well 
as a trace record of cognitive operations associated with 
the internal generation of that item. However, in the 
mindfulness condition, the trace record of cognitive 
operations is largely reduced. This reduction shifts the 
distribution associated with internally generated items to 
the right and increases the false alarm rate (i.e., the pro-
portion of the internal distribution that falls above the 
decision criterion). A test item that falls to the far right, by 
contrast, might be associated with considerable sensory 
content and would also have no trace record of cognitive 
operations associated with internal generation (because 
the item was externally presented). Mindfulness, which 
selectively reduces cognitive operations, would therefore 
not change the representation of externally presented 
items, so the same external distribution would apply in 
both the control and the mindfulness conditions. If the 
decision criterion remains fixed across conditions, this 
Strength of Source Information
External (Control and Mindfulness)
Internal (Control)
Internal (Mindfulness)
Strong
Internal
Strong
External
“Old (External)”“New (Internal)”
Fig. 2. Signal detection model representing how mindfulness medita-
tion influences the distributions of source information for internally 
generated and externally presented items (relative to a control con-
dition). According to this model, mindfulness meditation reduces the 
ability to discriminate between internally generated and externally pre-
sented memories by shifting the distribution of internally generated 
items to the right without influencing the distribution of externally pre-
sented items.
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increase in the false alarm rate would not be accompa-
nied by a change in the hit rate associated with externally 
generated items. Thus, the selective change in the false 
alarm rate would affect measured bias (more liberal in 
the mindfulness condition than in the control condition) 
even though the decision criterion remained unchanged.
Measured bias reflects the distance of the criterion 
line (i.e., the point at which participants switch from 
responding “new” to responding “old”) from the point of 
intersection for the internal and external distributions. In 
Figure 2, the point of intersection for the internal and 
external distributions in the mindfulness condition is far-
ther to the right than the point of intersection for the 
internal and external distributions in the control condi-
tion. This means that the relative position of the criterion 
line (indicated by the vertical line in the center of the 
figure) is farther to the left of the intersection of the 
internal and external distributions in the mindfulness 
condition than in the control condition. This change in 
the relative location of the criterion line is why measured 
bias (c) changes between conditions, even though the 
absolute location of the criterion line stays the same in 
this model. Thus, the model predicts that measured bias 
should be more liberal for the mindfulness condition 
than for the control condition because of this change in 
the relative location of the decision criterion (resulting 
from an increase in the mean of the internal distribution 
in that condition). This simple model accounts for all of 
the results observed in Experiment 3, and it explains 
why false-memory susceptibility increases after mindful-
ness meditation.
A simple criterion-shift model (in which the distribu-
tions remain in the same locations but the criterion line 
changes) cannot fully account for the Experiment 3 
results. Not only did measured bias change between con-
ditions, d′ values also changed between conditions. The 
lower d′ value in the mindfulness condition means that 
the internal and external distributions moved in a manner 
that resulted in greater overlap between the two distribu-
tions. A simple criterion-shift model can explain only the 
change in measured bias; it cannot explain the change in 
d′ values observed between conditions.
Another possible model assumes that the effect occurs 
at retrieval rather than during encoding. Such a model can 
explain the change in d′ values but cannot readily explain 
all of the Experiment 3 results. According to this retrieval-
based interpretation, one might assume that participants in 
the mindfulness condition respond on the basis of famil-
iarity without engaging in recollection of source informa-
tion (whereas control participants do engage in recollection 
of source information). In the absence of recollection, the 
internal distribution in the mindfulness condition would 
be to the right (in the external direction) of the internal 
distribution in the control condition because recollection 
would not count as evidence against familiar-but-imagined 
items having appeared on the list. By contrast, the external 
distribution in the mindfulness condition would be to the 
left (in the internal direction) of the external distribution in 
the control condition because recollection would not add 
evidence in favor of target items having appeared on the 
list. Thus, d′ values would be lower for the mindfulness 
condition, consistent with our results. However, the sim-
plest version of this account would predict a difference in 
both hit and false alarm rates across conditions with no 
effect on measured bias, whereas we observed a selective 
effect on the false alarm rate and a clear effect on mea-
sured bias.
Mindfulness meditation appears to reduce reality-mon-
itoring accuracy. By embracing judgment-free awareness 
and acceptance, meditators can have greater difficulty dif-
ferentiating internal and external sources of information. 
As a result, the same aspects of mindfulness that create 
countless benefits can also have the unintended negative 
consequence of increasing false-memory susceptibility.
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Note
1. These lists were not counterbalanced between preinduction 
and postinduction (which is not ideal for the within-subjects 
comparisons) because the preinduction lists were originally 
included to serve as covariates in the analysis of the postinduc-
tion word lists.
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Abstract 
Verbally describing a face has been found to impair subsequent 
recognition of that face from a photo lineup, a phenomenon known as the verbal 
overshadowing effect (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990).  Recently, a large 
direct replication study successfully reproduced that original finding (Alogna et al. 
2014).  However, in both the original study and the replication studies, memory 
was tested using only target-present lineups (i.e., lineups containing the 
previously-seen target face), making it possible to compute the correct ID rate 
(i.e., the hit rate) but not the false ID rate (i.e., the false alarm rate).  Thus, the 
lower correct ID rate for the verbal condition could reflect either reduced 
discriminability or a conservative criterion shift relative to the control condition.  In 
four verbal overshadowing experiments reported here, we measured both correct 
ID rates and false ID rates using photo lineups (Experiments 1 and 2) or single-
photo showups (Experiments 3 and 4).  The experimental manipulation (verbally 
describing the face or not) occurred either immediately after encoding 
(Experiments 1 and 3) or 20-minutes after encoding (Experiments 2 and 4).  In 
the immediate condition, discriminability did not differ between groups, but in the 
delayed condition, discriminability was lower in the verbal description group (i.e., 
a verbal overshadowing effect was observed).  A fifth experiment found that the 
effect of the immediate-vs.-delayed manipulation may be attributable to a change 
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in the content of verbal descriptions, with the ratio of diagnostic to generic facial 
features in the descriptions decreasing as delay increases.  
Introduction 
A police lineup is administered to victims and eyewitnesses to aid criminal 
investigations. The lineup is a collection of individuals, including the police 
suspect (who may be innocent or guilty) and a number of fillers (who are known 
to be innocent and resemble the perpetrator). Verbally reporting the details of a 
crime is a necessity in the investigative process. Whether or not the very act of 
reporting details about the perpetrator retrieved from memory impairs later 
memory for the perpetrator has been a topic of interest and debate for the last 
several decades. Interest in this topic was triggered by a finding reported by 
Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990) in which participants watched a video of 
a simulated robbery and either verbally described the perpetrator or engaged in a 
control task. Participants who gave verbal descriptions were significantly less 
likely to correctly identify the perpetrator from a lineup test than those in the 
control condition. This somewhat counterintuitive finding, termed the “verbal 
overshadowing effect,” has potential implications for the criminal justice system.  
 Because follow-up research yielded mixed results and a meta-analysis 
yielded effect sizes much smaller than the original experiments (Meissner & 
Brigham, 2001), a large direct replication study was recently conducted on two of 
the original experiments (Experiments 1 and 4 of Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 
1990; Alogna et al. 2014). In both experiments, the main experimental 
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manipulation was the same: participants either verbally described the perpetrator 
or took part in a control task. The only difference between the experiments was 
the order of procedural events. As shown in Figure 3.1, the experimental 
manipulation took place immediately after presentation of the video in 
Experiment 4 of Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (Figure 3.1A) or 20 minutes 
after the presentation of the video in Experiment 1 of Schooler and Engstler-
Schooler (Figure 3.1B). The effect replicated: compared to the control condition, 
the perpetrator was less likely to be identified from the lineup in both 
experiments, but the effect was much larger when the verbal description was 
provided 20 minutes after the video (and immediately before the lineup test).  
In a typical eyewitness identification study, some participants are 
presented with a target-present lineup (i.e., a lineup that contains a photo of the 
guilty suspect) and other participants are presented with a target-absent lineup 
(i.e., a lineup in which the photo of the guilty suspect has been replaced by a 
photo of the innocent suspect). The measures of interest are the correct ID rate 
(the proportion of participants presented with a target-present lineup who 
correctly identify the guilty suspect) and the false ID rate (the proportion of 
participants presented with a target-absent lineup who incorrectly identify the 
innocent suspect). However, the original verbal-overshadowing experiments and 
the studies that recently replicated them included target-present lineups (i.e., 
lineups that contained a photo of the guilty suspect), but did not include target-
absent lineups. What these studies therefore showed is that the correct ID rate 
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was lower in the verbal description condition compared to the control condition. 
The effect of that manipulation on the false ID rate is unknown. Thus, the only 
safe conclusion is that there was a reduction in the probability of correctly 
identifying the perpetrator when a verbal description was provided, but whether 
that reduction in the correct ID rate occurred because of reduced discriminability 
or because of a more conservative response bias is unknown. Distinguishing 
between those alternative interpretations requires that the probability of 
identifying the innocent suspect be measured as well (e.g., Clare & 
Lewandowsky, 2004, Mickes, 2016; Mickes & Wixted, 2015; Rotello, Heit, & 
Dube, 2015; Smith & Flowe, 2015). Moreover, the applied implications of the 
verbal overshadowing effect are fully dependent on whether it arises because of 
reduced discriminability or because of a conservative response bias (Mickes & 
Wixted, 2015).  
Does providing a verbal description reduce discriminability? 
The “verbal overshadowing effect” refers to impaired recognition memory 
performance. Interpreted in terms of signal detection theory, impaired recognition 
performance refers to reduced discriminability. Thus, from that perspective, a 
true verbal overshadowing effect is properly defined as a reduction in 
discriminability – that is, a reduction in the ability to discriminate innocent from 
guilty suspects – as a consequence of describing the perpetrator (Mickes, 2016). 
To measure discriminability, both the correct ID rate and false ID rate must be 
taken into account.  
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To measure discriminability, the most accurate approach is to measure 
not just one correct and false ID rate per condition (e.g., verbal description vs. 
control) but to measure the full range of correct and false ID rates that can be 
achieved in each condition across different levels of response bias. The entire 
family of achievable correct and false ID rates for a given condition is known as 
the receiver operating characteristic (ROC). ROC analysis is most easily 
performed by plotting correct vs. false identification rates across different levels 
of confidence. The ensuing ROC curves are constructed for both conditions and 
the area under the curve (AUC) for each condition is measured and statistically 
compared (for descriptions of how to conduct ROC analysis of lineup data, see 
Gronlund, Wixted & Mickes, 2014; Mickes, Flowe & Wixted, 2012). The larger the 
AUC, the better the discriminability. Evidence of a true verbal overshadowing 
effect would consist of a smaller AUC when a verbal description is provided 
compared to when a verbal description was not provided.  
Does providing a verbal description affect reliability? 
 If verbal overshadowing does in fact reduce discriminability, it seems 
natural to suppose that it reduces the reliability of a suspect ID. However, 
whether or not providing a verbal description affects discriminability is a different 
question than whether or not providing a verbal description affects the reliability 
of a suspect identification from a lineup. Whether discriminability is low or high, 
an experimental manipulation that induces conservative responding will yield 
relatively high reliability (i.e., identifications will tend to be accurate), whereas a 
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manipulation that induces liberal responding will yield relatively low reliability (i.e., 
identifications will tend to be less accurate). Reliability can be measured in 
several different ways, including calibration analysis and confidence-accuracy 
characteristic (CAC) analysis (Mickes, 2015). Calibration analysis has the 
potential to underestimate reliability because the relevant equation includes filler 
identifications (for a comprehensive explanation of the differences between 
calibration and CAC analysis, see Wixted, Read, & Lindsay, 2016). CAC 
analysis, on the other hand, involves only suspect (guilty and innocent) ID 
accuracy as a function of confidence. This is the measure that is of most 
relevance to the legal system, which is interested in knowing the probability that 
a suspect who has been identified is actually guilty. When the base rates of 
target-present and target-absent lineups are equal (as is typically true of lab 
studies), this measure is given by:  
!!" = 	 %&%& + %( 
where PPV is positive predictive value, Sg is the number of correct identifications, 
and Si refers to the number of estimated innocent suspect identifications1. PPV is 
the probability that a suspect who was identified by a witness is in fact guilty, and 
it is computed separately for every level of confidence. For example, for 
participants who identify a suspect with high confidence, the PPVhigh is given by: 
																																																						
1	If	there	is	no	designated	innocent	suspect,	the	false	suspect	identification	rate	is	
estimated	by	dividing	filler	IDs	from	target-absent	lineups	by	the	number	of	lineup	
members.	
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where Sg(high) is the number of correct suspect IDs made with high confidence 
and Si(high) is the number of innocent suspect identifications made with high 
confidence. If the PPV for identifications made with high confidence were higher 
when no verbal description was provided, then reliability would be higher in that 
condition. It is possible, however, that even if discriminability is lower when a 
verbal description is provided, reliability could be higher (Mickes, 2016). This 
could happen if, for example, verbal descriptions reduced discriminability while at 
the same time induced very conservative responding. 
Investigating the Effect of Verbal Descriptions on Discriminability and 
Reliability 
To test the effect of verbal descriptions on discriminability and reliability, 
we directly replicated Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990) in four experiments. 
Following suit of the replication studies (Alogna et al., 2014), we replicated 
Experiments 1 and 4 of the original paper, with one critical difference – the 
inclusion of target-absent lineups. The original and replication studies tested 
memory on 8-person simultaneous lineups. To be able to use the same stimuli 
and include target-absent lineups, the lineup size was reduced to 6-person 
simultaneous lineups so that the perpetrator could be replaced with a filler for 
target-absent lineups. In our Experiment 1, the experimental manipulation (verbal 
description vs. control task) took place immediately after the study phase, and in 
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our Experiment 2, the experimental manipulation took place 20 minutes after the 
study phase (Figure 3.1).  
In two additional experiments, we tested the effect of verbal descriptions 
on showups. Showups involve the presentation of only one person (the suspect) 
on the recognition test. Though showups are believed to be highly suggestive in 
nature (Goodsell, Wetmore, Neuschatz, & Gronlund, 2013; Steblay, Dysart, 
Fulero, & Lindsay, 2003) and have been found to yield lower discriminability than 
lineups (Wetmore et al., 2015; Mickes, 2015), showups will continue to be widely 
used by the police because they can be administered soon after a crime has 
been committed. As in Experiments 1 and 2, Experiments 3 and 4 retained the 
same procedural order as the original and replication experiments (see Figure 
3.1). For these experiments, discriminability and reliability were again measured 
with ROC and CAC analysis, respectively. Finally, in a fifth experiment, we 
conducted a content analysis in an effort to determine why verbal descriptions 
have the effect they do on recognition memory performance. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
Undergraduate students (N = 780) at the University of California, San 
Diego (UCSD) participated online for course credit. Sample size (for Experiments 
1 and 2) was based on a power calculation that aimed to achieve 80% power 
(using results from an earlier lineup study, Mickes, Flowe, & Wixted, 2012, to 
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estimate the effect size). Participants (n = 63) reported that they previously 
viewed the video and were therefore not included in the analyses. Of the 
remaining (n = 717; 472 female, 239 male, and 6 did not specify), the average 
age = 20.5 years (sd = 2.55). Participants were randomly assigned to the control 
condition or the verbal condition and were tested on a target-absent lineup 
(ncontrol = 188; nverbal = 168) or a target-present lineup (ncontrol = 171; nverbal = 190) 
based on random assignment. The UCSD Institutional Review Board approved 
all of the experiments. 
Materials 
The stimuli included the 44 second video of the mock bank 
robbery and the eight photos (one of the perpetrator and seven fillers) used in 
original experiments (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). The test phase 
included 6-person lineups with the images arranged in a 2x3 array. Images of the 
target and fillers from the original experiments were used for target-present and 
target-absent lineups. Target-present lineups were constructed using five of the 
seven fillers’ images (that were randomly selected for each participant), and the 
photo of the perpetrator (and all of the images were randomly arranged for each 
participant). Target-absent lineups were constructed using six of the seven fillers’ 
images (that were randomly selected and randomly arranged for each 
participant). The distractor task was an online crossword puzzle similar to the 
puzzle used in the original experiments (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). 
Procedure 
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The experiment was conducted online. Participants watched the video, 
typed as many countries and capitals as possible within 5-minutes (control 
condition) or provided a description of the perpetrator from the video for 5-
minutes (verbal condition), and engaged in the 20-minute distractor task (see 
Figure 3.1A). The same instructions listed in the approved final protocol for the 
Alogna et al. (2014) study were used for the 5-minute writing task for participants 
in both conditions. Those in verbal conditions were given the following 
instructions from Alogna et al.: “Please describe the appearance of the bank 
robber in as much detail as possible. It is important that you attempt to describe 
all of his different facial features. Please write down everything that you can think 
of regarding the bank robber’s appearance. It is important that you try to describe 
him for the full 5 minutes” (pp. 559-560). After a 20-minute distractor task, 
memory for the perpetrator was tested on a lineup where participants were asked 
to try to identify the perpetrator or choose the “not present” option and rate their 
confidence on a 7-point scale (1 = guessing; 7 = certain). 
Results and Discussion 
 Table 3.1 shows the frequency counts for each response type for target-
present and target-absent lineups by levels of confidence. The average correct 
ID rate was higher for the verbal condition (0.52) than the control condition 
(0.49). False ID rates were estimated by dividing the number of filler 
identifications by the number of lineup members. The estimated false ID rate was 
lower for the verbal condition (0.09) than the control condition (0.11). Thus, 
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discriminability was, if anything, higher in the verbal group. We conducted ROC 
analysis to compare the locus of correct and false ID rates of both groups for a 
more complete assessment. The ROC curves in Figure 3.2A show higher 
discriminability for the verbal group. However, using a false ID rate cutoff 
of .458,2 partial area under the curve (pAUC) analyses revealed that the 
difference between the verbal group (0.183) and the control group (0.153) was 
not significant, D = 1.20, p = .232. In other words, neither a verbal 
overshadowing effect nor its opposite was observed. 
The curves in Figure 3.2A were generated from fitting a basic equal 
variance signal detection-based model to the ROC data from the control and the 
verbal conditions. In the model, memory strengths are distributed according to 
two Gaussian distributions, one representing fillers (which includes an innocent 
suspect) and one representing targets. This model assumes that to create target-
absent lineups, six random draws are made from the filler distribution, and to 
create target-present lineups, five random draws are made from the filler 
distribution and one random draw is made from the target distribution. In the 
simplest version of this model, an identification is made if the memory strength of 
the most familiar face in the lineup exceeds a decision criterion. 
																																																						
2 This value was selected because it is the false ID rate of the rightmost point on 
the ROC curve of the verbal condition, the more conservative of the two 
conditions (Gronlund, Wixted, & Mickes, 2014). Using the false ID value of the 
rightmost point on the ROC curve of the control condition as the cutoff does not 
change the conclusion (p = .142). 
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The filler distribution was set to μlure = 0, σlure = 1, and the corresponding 
mean for the target distribution was estimated by fitting the model to the data. 
Correct and false identifications were binned into low (ratings of 1-3), medium 
(ratings of 4-5) and high (ratings of 6-7) levels of confidence and used for the 
different decision criteria. The model estimates d' and the three decision criteria. 
Fits were improved (but conclusions were not changed) by including another 
parameter, δ, which scales the estimated placements of the confidence criteria 
for target-present lineups relative to target-absent lineups (Seale-Carlisle & 
Mickes, 2016). Thus, there were a total of 10 parameters for both conditions, and 
each condition had 18 degrees of freedom: 3 degrees of freedom (filler 
identifications made with low, medium, or high confidence) for target-absent 
lineups (both conditions) and 6 degrees of freedom (filler identifications or 
suspect identifications made with low, medium, or high confidence) for target-
present lineups (both conditions). The fits were performed simultaneously and 
had 8 degrees of freedom (18 degrees of freedom - 10 free parameters). 
The parameters were adjusted until the difference between observed and 
predicted frequency counts was minimized using a chi-square goodness-of-fit 
statistic. The fit was good, χ2(8) = 8.41, p = .394. Constraining d' to be equal for 
verbal and control conditions also resulted in a good fit, χ2(6) = 10.13, p = .119. 
The full model fit and the constrained model fit did not differ significantly, p 
= .190, indicating that d' did not differ for the two conditions. Thus, as is typically 
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(but not necessarily) true, the results from the atheoretical pAUC analysis and 
the theoretical signal detection analysis agree. 
The analyses presented above were concerned with discriminability. As 
noted earlier, reliability is a different issue. To measure the reliability of suspect 
IDs as a function of confidence in each condition, we conducted CAC analysis. 
Confidence ratings were binned in the same manner as for the model fits, and 
CAC was computed for identifications made with low, medium and high levels of 
confidence. The error bars represent standard error bars estimated using a 
bootstrap procedure (see Seale-Carlisle & Mickes, 2016). Figure 3.2B shows that 
the verbal group had higher reliability at each level of confidence, but none of the 
differences were significant.  
Overall, neither discriminability nor reliability differed significantly between 
groups. In the original experiment in which the experimental manipulation 
occurred immediately after the study phase and 20 minutes prior to the 
identification procedure, the correct ID rate for the control group (0.71) was much 
higher than the verbal group (0.49) (Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). In the 
analogous replication experiment (Alogna et al., 2014), the average correct ID 
rate for the control group (0.55) was also higher than the verbal group (0.51), but 
the difference between the correct ID rates reported was considerably smaller. 
Three of the 31 participating laboratories found no difference between conditions, 
and 10 found a higher correct ID rate in the verbal condition than in the control 
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condition. Our results also revealed slightly higher correct ID rates for the verbal 
group (0.52) than the control group (0.49).  
Confidence and accuracy were related for both groups. Identifications 
made with medium confidence were higher in accuracy than identifications made 
with low confidence, and lower in accuracy than identifications made with high 
confidence. Furthermore, CAC analysis revealed that identifications made with 
high confidence were comparably reliable for both groups.  
Experiment 2 
 
Experiment 2 was the same as Experiment 1 with the exception of 
swapping procedural order. In Experiment 2, the experimental manipulation took 
place 20 minutes after the study phase and immediately before the identification 
test (see Figure 3.1B). This was the order in which the greatest difference in 
correct identification rates resulted between groups in the replication experiments 
(Alogna et al., 2014). Also, as in Experiment 1, target-absent lineups were 
included to assess discriminability and reliability.  
Method 
Participants  
Participants (N = 780) were recruited from Royal Holloway, University of 
London (n = 138), Amazon Mechanical Turk (n = 245), and SampleSize (n = 
397). The participants (n = 10) who reported previously viewing the video 
were excluded from the analyses. Of the remaining (n = 770, 442 female; 318 
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male; 10 did not state), the average age = 27.9 years (sd = 11.1) Participants 
were randomly assigned to the control condition or the verbal condition and a 
target-absent lineup (ncontrol = 179; nverbal = 185) or a target-present lineup (ncontrol 
= 196; nverbal = 210). Royal Holloway, University of London Research Ethics 
Committee approved this study. 
Materials and Procedure  
The materials were the same used in Experiment 1. The procedure was 
the same with one exception: the experimental manipulation took place after the 
20-minute distractor task and immediately before the test phase (see Figure 
3.1B).  
Results and Discussion 
Table 3.1 shows the frequency counts for target-present and target-absent 
lineups by levels of confidence. The correct ID rate was lower in the verbal group 
(0.38) compared to the control group (0.62). The false ID rate was also lower in 
the verbal group (0.07) than the control group (0.09), which could mean that 
there is a difference in response bias, not discriminability, per se. We therefore 
conducted ROC analysis to measure discriminability independent of response 
bias. Figure 3.3A shows the ROC curves for both groups, and discriminability 
was lower in the verbal group than the control group. Using a false ID rate cutoff 
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of .584,3 pAUC analysis revealed that the difference between the verbal (.096) 
and control (.155) groups was significant, D = 3.06, p = .002.  
The ROC curves were generated from the same equal variance signal 
detection model as in Experiment 1. The ROC data were also fit, using the same 
parameters as in Experiment 1, and again, the fit was good, χ2(8) = 6.12, p 
= .634. However, when d' was constrained to be equal, the fit was worse, χ2(6) = 
17.53, p = .008, and the fit was significantly different than when d' values were 
free to vary, p < .001. Thus, once again (and as expected), atheoretical pAUC 
analysis and theoretical signal detection analysis agree that discriminability was 
reduced in the verbal condition. 
We next turned to the issue of reliability. The CAC curves, shown in Figure 
3.3B, show slightly lower reliability across all three levels of confidence for the 
verbal group, but the differences were not significant at any of the levels of 
confidence. Moreover, confidence and accuracy are related (i.e., high confidence 
identifications are more accurate than low confidence identifications). High-
confidence accuracy in the control condition was .95, whereas high-confidence 
accuracy in the verbal condition was .91. Thus, in both conditions, accuracy was 
high, and the small difference between them was not significant. 
																																																						
3	Consistent	with	Experiment	1,	this	value	was	selected	because	it	is	the	rightmost	point	
on	the	ROC	curve	of	the	verbal	condition	(the	more	conservative	condition).	Using	the	
false	ID	value	of	the	rightmost	point	on	the	ROC	curve	of	the	control	condition	as	the	
cutoff	does	not	change	the	conclusion	(p	=	.002).	
  
41 
In the current experiment, the correct ID rate was lower in the verbal 
condition compared to the control condition (0.38 vs. 0.62, respectively). This 
pattern was consistent with the original experiments (Schooler & Engstler-
Schooler, 1990) and replication experiments (Alogna et al., 2014) when the 
verbal description task was delayed for 20 minutes after encoding. In the former, 
the correct ID rate was lower for the verbal condition (0.39) vs. the control 
condition (0.64). Similarly, in the latter, the average correct ID rate for the verbal 
condition (0.38) was lower than that of the control condition (0.54). Although 
those results are ambiguous as to whether they reflect either reduced 
discriminability or more conservative responding (or both), the ROC results 
reported here revealed significantly lower discriminability in the verbal condition 
(Figure 3.3A).   
Despite the fact that discriminability was lower in the verbal condition, 
reliability was not significantly different (similar to the findings in Experiment 1) 
between the two conditions. Furthermore, high-confidence identifications were 
much more accurate than low-confidence identifications in both conditions. Thus, 
with regard to assessing the probative value of an ID, knowing confidence is far 
more informative than knowing whether or not the suspect's face was verbally 
described (despite the large verbal overshadowing effect). Next, we extended the 
replication further by testing the effect of verbal descriptions on discriminability 
and reliability when memory is tested using showups.   
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Experiment 3 
 In Experiment 3 we sought to replicate the pattern of results from 
Experiment 1. Thus, the procedure was held constant except that participants 
were tested on either a target-present or target-absent showup (i.e., the guilty 
suspect or innocent suspect, respectively). Again, we measured discriminability 
with ROC analysis and reliability with CAC analysis.   
Method 
Participants 
UCSD undergraduate students participated online for course credit (N = 
1,197; 410 male, 773 female, 14 unspecified; average age = 20.2 years, sd = 
2.7). There are no earlier showup studies (i.e., showup vs. showup studies) to 
inform a power analysis, so sample size (for Experiments 3 and 4) was increased 
to 1,100 and we stopped data collection when the term ended. Participants were 
randomly assigned to the control condition or the verbal condition. Participants 
were also randomly assigned to a target-absent showup (control n = 300; verbal 
n = 293) or a target-present showup (control n = 328; verbal n = 276). 
Materials 
The materials were the same as those in Experiment 1 and 2, except an 
online game of Tetris was played instead of a crossword puzzle as the distractor 
task. Target-present showups were constructed by using the target photo, and 
target-absent showups were constructed by randomly selecting one of the seven 
filler photos.  
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Procedure 
Procedural order was the same as in Experiment 1 (see Figure 3.1A). The 
only differences were that showups replaced lineups and participants rated their 
confidence on a 0-100% scale (0 = guessing; 100% = certain). 
Results and Discussion 
Table 3.1 shows the frequency counts for each response type for target-
present and target-absent lineups by levels of confidence. The correct ID rate 
was higher for the control condition (0.65) than for the verbal condition (0.57). 
Likewise, the false ID rate was higher for the control condition (0.29) than for the 
verbal condition (0.18). Thus, on the surface, these results indicate that, at a 
minimum, verbal descriptions induced more conservative responding. Figure 
3.4A shows that the two conditions yielded ROC curves that are not noticeably 
different, suggesting that verbal descriptions did not affect discriminability. The 
statistical comparison of the AUC values between the verbal (0.756) and control 
(0.735) conditions confirm this impression, D = 0.71, p = .481.  
Next, correct and false identifications were binned into low (0-60%), 
medium (70-80%), and high (90-100%) confidence ratings to perform signal 
detection model fits to the ROC data and to conduct CAC analysis. The ROC 
curves in Figure 3.4A were generated by fitting the ROC data using the same 
equal variance signal detection model described previously with one less 
parameter (because there are no filler identifications with showups). The fit was 
good, χ2(6) = 6.76, p = .344. Constraining d' to be equal did not significantly 
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worsen the fit, p = .663.  
The CAC curves (using the same confidence binning as for the model fits) 
in Figure 3.4B show no significant reliability differences between condition across 
the levels of confidence. Once again, confidence is predictive of accuracy, but 
the relationship for the verbal condition does not continue to increase from 
medium to high confidence. Also, high confidence identifications are noticeably 
lower in accuracy compared with what we observed for lineups (averaged across 
conditions, high-confidence showup accuracy = 0.80).  
Experiment 4 
In Experiment 4 we sought to replicate the pattern of results from 
Experiment 2, and like in Experiment 3, memory was tested on a target-absent or 
target-present showup. Again, we measured discriminability with ROC analysis 
and reliability with CAC analysis.   
Method 
Participants 
UCSD undergraduate students participated online for course credit (N = 
1,196; 364 male, 822 female, 10 unspecified; average age = 20.3 years, sd = 
2.3). Participants were randomly assigned to the control condition or the verbal 
condition. Memory was tested on a target-absent showup (ncontrol = 302; nverbal  = 
322) or a target-present showup (ncontrol = 311; nverbal = 261). 
Materials 
All materials were the same as in Experiment 3. 
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Procedure  
The procedure was the same as Experiment 3 with exception of the order 
of the distractor task and the experimental manipulation (the same order as 
Experiment 2; see Figure 3.1B). The writing task took place after the 20-minute 
distractor task and immediately before the test phase.  
Results and Discussion 
Table 3.1 shows the frequency counts for each response type for target-
present and target-absent lineups by levels of confidence. Similar to the results in 
Experiment 2 (and the analogous replication study), the correct ID rate was lower 
in the verbal condition (0.43) than in the control condition (0.68). Also as in 
Experiment 2, the false ID rate was lower in the verbal condition (0.17) than the 
control condition (0.25). Again, these results are consistent with the idea that, at 
a minimum, providing verbal descriptions induced more conservative responding. 
To measure discriminability, ROC analysis was conducted. The ROC curves, as 
shown in Figure 3.5A, and AUC analysis reveal that discriminability is lower for 
the verbal condition (0.70) than the control condition (0.77), and that difference is 
significant, D = 2.36, p = .018. The curves in Figure 3.5A were generated by 
fitting the ROC data using the same equal variance signal detection model 
described in Experiment 3. Again, the fit was good, χ2(6) = 3.28, p = .778, and 
constraining d' to be equal worsened the fit to a marginally significant degree, p 
= .052. Thus, a verbal overshadowing effect is evident whether an atheoretical 
measure (AUC) or a theoretical measure (d') is used to interpret the results. 
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Despite the difference in discriminability, the CAC curves in Figure 3.5B 
again reveal no significant differences between conditions in reliability at all 
levels of confidence. However, there is a trend towards lower accuracy in the 
verbal conditions for IDs made with low or medium confidence. As in the other 
experiments, identifications made with high confidence are higher in accuracy 
than identifications made with medium and low confidence. High-confidence 
accuracy was 0.87 in both conditions. The results shown in Figure 3.5A and 3.5B 
illustrate a key point: a reduction in discriminability does not automatically 
translate into reduced reliability of IDs made with high confidence. As noted 
earlier, knowing the effect of a variable on discriminability does not automatically 
reveal the effect of that same variable on the reliability of an ID. 
Experiment 5 
In Experiments 1 and 3, participants in the verbal condition provided 
descriptions immediately after encoding, and discriminability did not differ from 
the control condition, regardless of whether memory was tested using a lineup or 
a showup. However, when verbal descriptions were provided after a delay (as in 
Experiments 2 and 4), discriminability was impaired for both procedures. What 
accounts for the difference in discriminability depending on whether or not the 
description is delayed?  
The diagnostic feature-detection hypothesis may provide insight into this 
difference (Wixted & Mickes, 2014). The hypothesis was initially proposed to 
account for the discriminability advantage that simultaneous lineup presentations 
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have over procedures that involve showing an individual in isolation (as with 
sequential lineups or showups). By seeing the lineup members together, it is 
readily apparent to the witness that there are facial features shared across lineup 
members that should be discounted because they are not diagnostic of guilt. For 
example, if the perpetrator were a young, White male, then attaching weight to 
those features would not be helpful and would instead serve to impair 
discriminability because all of the lineup members would be young, White males. 
Having the faces presented simultaneously allows eyewitnesses to immediately 
detect and discount non-diagnostic features and to instead attach more weight 
on features that are not shared and are thus more diagnostic. This 
discrimination-enhancing strategy is less likely to be used when lineup members 
are presented individually because, under those conditions, it is harder to detect 
(and then discount) the common, non-diagnostic facial features.  
The same concept may help to explain why verbal descriptions only impair 
discriminability when they are made after a delay. More specifically, participants 
may use more diagnostic feature descriptions immediately after encoding the 
perpetrator's face than they do after a delay. After a delay, by contrast, some 
forgetting will undoubtedly occur, and the description may become more general, 
perhaps becoming more likely to correspond to the common features that match 
everyone in the subsequently presented lineup. In that case, the participants may 
have a tendency to rely on the description they just gave when trying to identify 
the face of the perpetrator. To the extent that they rely on the general (common) 
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facial features mentioned in the verbal description, discriminability would be 
impaired.  
To assess whether or not the diagnostic feature-detection hypothesis can 
help to account for the differences in discriminability when verbal descriptions are 
delayed, we first conducted a content analysis of the verbal descriptions provided 
in Experiments 1 through 4. We then conducted an experiment to test our theory. 
Content Analysis 
To conduct content analysis, 20 words were identified based on the 
appearance of the eight images of the perpetrator and fillers. Ten words were 
selected that were judged by the experimenters to be useful in differentiating the 
perpetrator from fillers (diagnostic-feature words), and 10 words were selected 
that were also judged by the experimenters to be less useful in differentiating the 
perpetrator from fillers (non-diagnostic-feature words). The latter words could 
have been used when selecting the fillers (e.g., White, male, attributes that 
related to hair color and stature). The diagnostic-feature words were descriptors 
that were not shared by all of the lineup members (see Appendix). The non-
diagnostic-feature words were descriptors that were shared by all of the lineup 
members (see Appendix). The diagnostic-feature and non-diagnostic feature 
words were counted from descriptions provided by participants in the verbal 
condition in Experiments 1 and 3 (immediate descriptions) and compared with 
those descriptions in Experiments 2 and 4 (delayed descriptions).  
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Significantly more diagnostic-feature words were used when verbal 
descriptions were provided immediately after encoding (Experiments 1 and 3) 
compared to when verbal descriptions were provided 20 minutes after encoding 
(Experiments 2 and 4), t(1945) = 4.75, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 0.22. However, 
there was no significant difference between the number of non-diagnostic feature 
words, t(1945) = 1.28, p = .201. A 2 × 2 analysis of variance revealed a 
significant interaction between type of feature (diagnostic vs. non-diagnostic) and 
time of verbal description (immediate vs. delayed), F(1, 3890) = 15.96, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 0.06. These results provide evidence for the diagnostic feature-
detection hypothesis. 
In light of these findings, we conducted an experiment to test whether 
more diagnostic words were used when the verbal descriptions were provided 
immediately after encoding compared to after a delay. The participants in this 
experiment did not watch a video of the perpetrator but instead read either the 
descriptions that were written immediately after encoding or after a delay. They 
were then tasked with trying to identify the perpetrator from a lineup based on 
description only (i.e., they did not view the video). If the immediate descriptions 
contain more diagnostically useful information, then participants provided with 
those descriptions should be better able to identify the perpetrator from the lineup 
compared to the participants provided with the delayed descriptions.  
Method 
Participants  
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UCSD undergraduate participants took part in exchange for course credit 
(N = 128; 44 male, 81 female, 3 unspecified; mean age = 20.3 years, sd = 2.3). 
There are no previous studies to inform a power analysis, so we selected a 
sample size of 100 and stopped collecting data at the end of the term. 
Participants were randomly selected to read descriptions from Experiment 3 (n = 
63) or Experiment 4 (n = 65). None had participated in the previous experiments.  
Materials 
The materials were the descriptions written by the participants in the 
verbal condition in Experiment 3 (written immediately after encoding; Figure 
3/1A) and Experiment 4 (written after a 20-minute delay; Figure 3.1B), which 
were 569 and 583 descriptions, respectively.   
Procedure 
For each participant, one description was randomly selected from the pool 
of descriptions. Participants read the description and were immediately 
presented with an 8-person simultaneous target-present lineup (using the seven 
fillers and the perpetrator described in the previous experiments). The images 
were arranged in random order for each participant. Based on the description 
they read, participants attempted to identify the person they thought had 
committed the crime with no option to reject the lineup (i.e., no “not present” 
option).  
Results and Discussion 
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Participants who read the descriptions that were written immediately after 
encoding were significantly more likely to correctly identify the perpetrator (M = 
0.14, 95% CI = [.08, .25]) than participants who had read descriptions written 
after the delay (M = 0.03, 95% CI = [.01, .11]), z = 2.26, p = .024. Note that 
selecting a lineup member randomly from a perfectly fair 8-person lineup would 
result in a correct ID rate of 0.13. However, no lineup is perfectly fair. The low 
perpetrator selection rate in the control condition could either mean that the 
lineup was inherently biased towards one or more of the fillers (away from the 
perpetrator) or that the descriptions written after a delay had the effect of biasing 
selections towards one or more of the fillers (perhaps because they matched a 
more generic description than the perpetrator did).   
In agreement with the diagnostic feature-detection hypothesis, more 
diagnostic-feature words were used in the descriptions when those descriptions 
were provided straightaway. Also consistent with the diagnostic feature-detection 
hypothesis, participants were able to identify the perpetrator more often if they 
read the description that was written by participants who provided the description 
immediately after encoding versus after a delay. Those descriptions therefore 
must have been more informative (i.e., more diagnostic). If participants in a 
verbal overshadowing experiment rely to some extent on their own descriptions 
when attempting to identify the perpetrator from the lineup, the prediction would 
be that discriminability should be impaired when descriptions are delayed (an 
effect that was observed in Experiments 2 and 4).   
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General Discussion 
 In a series of experiments we investigated the effects of verbal 
descriptions on discriminability and reliability on lineups and showups. The 
correct identification findings replicated the original verbal overshadowing 
Experiments 1 and 4 of Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990) and the 
replication efforts (Alogna et al., 2014). However, conclusions about memory 
performance based only on correct ID rates are tenuous. We therefore extended 
those findings by including target-absent lineups to be able to assess 
discriminability and reliability.  
Effects of Verbal Reports on Discriminability 
 In Experiments 1-4, responding was more conservative in the verbal 
description condition. The relative conservatism is seen in the ROC curves in 
Figures 3.5 where the rightmost point on the verbal ROC is shifted leftward 
relative the rightmost point on the control ROC. Thus, one effect of providing 
verbal descriptions is to induce more conservative responding, and this 
phenomenon could account for the lower correct ID rates found in the original 
(Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990) and the replication studies (Alogna et al., 
2014). Why might this be? Clare and Lewandowsky (2004) proposed the idea 
that the task of describing the perpetrator makes participants realize that the task 
is challenging and as a result induces more cautious responding when faced with 
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making a lineup decision4. Our findings are consistent with this idea. However, 
above and beyond the conservative shift in responding, the results of 
Experiments 2 and 4 (involving delayed verbal descriptions) showed that 
discriminability in the verbal condition was also impaired.  
 Why is discriminability impaired by providing a verbal description after a 
delay but not by providing a verbal description immediately? This puzzling 
difference in discriminability could be explained by the diagnostic feature-
detection hypothesis (Wixted & Mickes, 2014). The hypothesis holds that 
discriminability will be better when eyewitnesses rely more on diagnostic features 
than less diagnostic features. We tested this account in two ways, by conducting 
a content analysis and an experiment. In both analyses, the diagnostic feature-
detection hypothesis provided a coherent interpretation of the data. Participants 
provided less diagnostic descriptions after a delay (presumably due to forgetting 
of more specific diagnostic details) compared to when descriptions were made 
immediately after encoding the face of the perpetrator, and other participants 
provided with those descriptions (but who did not see the mock-crime video) 
were better able to identify the perpetrator using the more diagnostic descriptions 
that had been written immediately after encoding.   
																																																						
4	While	Clare	and	Lewandowsky	found	lower	discriminability	(as	measured	by	d')	for	
participants	in	one	of	their	verbal	conditions	(the	Holistic	condition)	compared	to	a	
control	condition	in	Experiment	1	(the	experiment	most	analogous	to	Experiments	1	and	
2	here),	they	focused	on	the	differences	in	criterion	shifts.			
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Why people use less diagnostic information after time passes is a 
question that remains to be answered. Two potential theories may provide 
insight: fuzzy-trace theory and dual-process theories of recognition memory. 
Fuzzy-trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990) predicts that descriptions given 
after a delay would be based on gist representations versus descriptions given 
immediately, which would be based more on verbatim representations. This shift 
occurs because verbatim representations are thought to fade more rapidly than 
gist-based representations (e.g., Reyna, 2012). Indeed, Schooler (1998) once 
broadly linked verbal overshadowing with fuzzy trace theory, and it may be time 
to revisit this connection with more focus on the differential time course of gist 
and verbatim traces. Similarly, dual process theories might predict that 
descriptions provided soon after encoding are based on recollection, whereas 
descriptions provided later are based more on familiarity (e.g., Wais, Wixted, 
Hopkins, & Squire, 2006, but see e.g., Fortin, Wright, & Eichenbaum, 2004). 
Determining the usefulness of these theories could be a target for future research 
efforts.  
One possibility that cannot be ruled out by our findings is that participants 
who provided a description immediately after encoding may rely on their 
description less than participants who provided a description after a delay. 
Adding an additional 20-minute delay would be one way to assess this possibility. 
Another possibility that cannot be ruled out by our findings is that when the 
description is provided after a delay, participants rely less on diagnostic 
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information despite the fact that the memory is intact and more diagnostic 
information can be culled in ways that were not tested here. Relatedly, future 
research efforts could involve investigations of ways to induce eyewitnesses to 
generate diagnostic descriptions even after time passes. 
Effects of Verbal Reports on Reliability 
 In Experiments 1 through 4, the reliability of suspect IDs was comparable 
between conditions. Thus, even when discriminability was lower in the verbal 
condition, as was the case in Experiments 2 and 4, reliability was not appreciably 
different. Furthermore, adding to the body of literature that confidence and 
accuracy are related (e.g., Juslin, Olsson, & Winman, 1996; Brewer & Wells, 
2006; Palmer, Brewer, Weber, & Nagesh, 2013; Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, & 
Weber, 2010; Dodson & Dobolyi, 2016; Mickes, 2015; Wixted, Read, & Lindsay, 
2016), the relationship was strong for both of the conditions in these 
experiments. That is, PPV for high confidence identifications was higher than 
PPV for medium confidence identifications, which was higher for low confidence 
identifications. This was true even when the effect of verbal overshadowing on 
discriminability was strong (Experiments 2 and 4).  
A similar pattern (reduced discriminability without a concomitant reduction 
in reliability) has now been reported for manipulations such as retention interval 
(Palmer et al., 2013; Sauer et al., 2010; Wixted et al., 2016), same-vs.-cross race 
(Dodson & Dobolyi, 2016; Nguyen, Pezdek & Wixted, in press), and both 
exposure duration and divided attention (Palmer et al., 2013). In each case, the 
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manipulation in question had a strong effect on discriminability while having little 
to no effect on the reliability of an ID made with high confidence. Although fewer 
high-confidence IDs occur in the low-discriminability condition, when they do 
occur in that condition, they are typically as accurate (or nearly so) as high-
confidence IDs in the high-discriminability condition.  
Practical Implications 
The implications of these results for the criminal justice system seem 
straightforward. The results from ROC and CAC analyses are of interest to 
different decision-makers with ROC analysis being important for policymakers, 
who decide whether and when to ask for a verbal description, and CAC analysis 
being important for judges and jurors, who have no control over police policy but 
ought to know how reliable an ID is likely to be (Mickes, 2015; Mickes, 2016).  
Our ROC results suggest that, as they presumably already do, police 
should encourage reporting crimes immediately and then take down the 
description of the perpetrator as soon as possible. By doing so, the adverse 
effects of verbal descriptions on discriminability would be mitigated. Future 
research efforts should manipulate different timings of the verbal descriptions, 
including a more protracted time course (Mickes, 2016) so that evidence for the 
optimal time points could be determined.  
The CAC results are a matter of importance for judges and jurors who 
make decisions about culpability (Mickes, 2015; Mickes, 2016). On this issue, the 
message of our research likely differs from what has thought to be true of the 
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effect of verbal overshadowing. More specifically, our results suggest that, 
regardless of whether a verbal description was provided, the reliability of an ID 
made from a lineup or a showup was comparable. Moreover, high-confidence 
IDs from a lineup were quite accurate in both conditions (greater than 90% 
correct), whereas high-confidence IDs made from a showup were less accurate 
in both conditions. The fact that identifications made with high confidence are 
associated with lower PPV when memory is tested on showups than lineups 
should signal to judges and jurors that those identifications may be less 
trustworthy and thus should be taken with caution. 
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Table 3.1. Frequencies of suspect IDs, filler IDs, and no IDs for target-absent 
and target-present lineups for all levels of confidence in the control and verbal 
conditions in Experiments 1-4.  
 
 
 
 
 
Confidence Suspect	IDs Filler	IDs No	IDs Filler	IDs No	IDs Suspect	IDs Filler	IDs No	IDs Filler	IDs No	IDs
1 3 2 5 1 0 2
2 1 4 11 3 7 5
3 10 6 22 5 10 13
4 17 15 35 18 12 20
5 19 13 35 24 14 32
6 21 9 14 31 5 14
7 13 4 6 16 3 5
1 0 2 1 0 1 1
2 3 3 4 2 5 5
3 7 5 13 5 8 8
4 21 10 29 12 10 16
5 47 10 33 29 13 29
6 25 3 10 30 4 14
7 19 0 3 2 2 4
Suspect	IDs No	IDs Suspect	IDs No	IDs Suspect	IDs No	IDs Suspect	IDs No	IDs
0% 0 1 0 1
10% 0 0 1 0
20% 1 0 0 1
30% 3 0 2 1
40% 6 3 7 2
50% 15 7 9 5
60% 25 22 18 9
70% 51 23 42 15
80% 47 15 39 8
90% 30 9 20 4
100% 36 6 18 7
0% 1 0 0 0
10% 1 0 0 0
20% 1 0 1 1
30% 5 1 0 0
40% 8 4 4 4
50% 7 10 5 9
60% 23 11 22 11
70% 52 19 25 11
80% 54 21 19 14
90% 36 4 22 5
100% 23 6 14 1
100 226 266149
41 86 87 108
214
Target-present Target-absent
Experiment4
Target-present Target-absent
120 240114
Experiment	2
Experiment	3
Target-present Target-absent Target-present Target-absent
77416034
Control Verbal
Experiment	1
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Figure 3.1. Procedural order of the original Experiments 4 (A) and 1 (B) 
(Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990); Alogna et al. (2014) RRR1 (A) and RRR2 
(B); and the current Experiments 1 and 3 (A) and Experiments 2 and 4 (B). 
(Diagram adapted from Mickes, 2016) 
 
A
B
verbal description vs. control
Study phase Test phase
5 minutes 20 minutes
ID
verbal description vs. control ID
Study phase Test phase
20 minutes 5 minutes
(watch video)
(watch video)
  
60 
 
 
Figure 3.2.  Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) and confidence-accuracy 
characteristic (CAC) plots for the verbal and control conditions in Experiment 1. 
A) ROC data and curves that represent the fit of the signal detection model. The 
grey dashed line represents the line of chance performance. B) CAC plot of 
positive predictive value (PPV) as a function of confidence. Bars represent 
standard error bars estimated using a bootstrap procedure. 
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Figure 3.3. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) and confidence-accuracy 
characteristic (CAC) plots for the verbal and control conditions in Experiment 2. 
A) ROC data and curves that represent the fit of the signal detection model. The 
grey dashed line represents the line of chance performance. B) CAC plot of 
positive predictive value (PPV) as a function of confidence. Bars represent 
standard error bars estimated using a bootstrap procedure. 
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Figure 3.4. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) and confidence-accuracy 
characteristic (CAC) plots for the verbal and control conditions in Experiment 3. 
A) ROC data and curves that represent the fit of the signal detection model. The 
grey dashed line represents the line of chance performance. B) CAC plot of 
positive predictive value (PPV) as a function of confidence. Bars represent 
standard error bars estimated using a bootstrap procedure. 
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Figure 3.5. Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) and confidence-accuracy 
characteristic (CAC) plots for the verbal and control conditions in Experiment 4. 
A) ROC data and curves that represent the fit of the signal detection model. The 
grey dashed line represents the line of chance performance. B) CAC plot of 
positive predictive value (PPV) as a function of confidence. Bars represent 
standard error bars estimated using a bootstrap procedure.   
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Appendix 
 
Diagnostic Non-Diagnostic 
Words Immediate Delayed Words Immediate Delayed 
chin 76 65 white 491 517 
jaw 76 67 male 330 323 
cheek 127 89 age 266 295 
brow 560 531 brown 449 422 
forehead 51 38 black 586 526 
eye 673 623 moustache 59 140 
oval 33 15 dark 467 555 
round 201 186 weight 30 39 
wavy 116 86 build 71 94 
point 79 53 height 159 161 
 
Note. Different participants used different adjectives. For example, because 
“chin” (e.g., “pointy chin”) and “jaw” (e.g., “chiseled jaw”) were mentioned meant 
that there was something notable about them that was more diagnostic than 
ethnicity (“White”) and gender (“male”).  
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CHAPTER 4 
The Cross-Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification: 
Reduced Discriminability Does Not Necessarily Imply Reduced Reliability 
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Abstract 
The cross-race effect or own-race bias is a well-known finding in 
psychology wherein memory is worse for faces of a different race.  This research 
has considerable implications for the legal system, and expert witnesses 
regularly testify that cross-race identifications are less trustworthy than same 
race-identifications.  Lower overall memory (d¢), however, is not the question of 
interest to the legal system.  The legal system wants to know how likely a high-
confidence identification is to be accurate.  We replicate the standard cross-race 
effect and show that despite lower discriminability, high-confidence same-race 
and cross-race IDs were highly (and almost equally) reliable. In both cases, high-
confidence accuracy exceeded 95% correct.   
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Since Munsterberg (1908) first wrote about psychology and crime, 
researchers have studied factors that affect the accuracy of eyewitness memory.  
An extensive body of research shows that eyewitness accounts can be 
influenced by both system and estimator variables (Lampinen, Neuschatz, & 
Cling, 2012; Wells, 1978; Wells et al., 2000).  System variables are procedures 
that can be controlled by the criminal justice system, such as questioning of 
witnesses (Loftus, 1975; Loftus 1996), law enforcement-witness interactions 
(Clark, Marshall, & Rosenthal, 2009), and identification protocols (Clark, Brower, 
Rosenthal, Hicks, & Moreland, 2013; Douglass, Smith, & Fraser-Thill, 2005; Haw 
& Fisher, 2004; Wells et al., 1998).  Estimator variables, by contrast, are not 
under the control of the criminal justice system because they are characteristics 
of the crime itself.  Estimator variables include, for example, the presence of a 
weapon, witness stress, and the relationship between the race of the perpetrator 
and the race of the witness. 
 The same-vs.-cross-race estimator variable has been studied for nearly 50 
years (Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Sporer, 2001) and is 
the focus of this article.  Previous research has consistently found a cross-race 
effect (or "own-race bias") in that people are better at recognizing members of 
their own race than members of other races (Brigham & Malpass, 1985; Chiroro, 
Tredoux, Radaelli, & Meissner, 2008; Malpass, 1974; Pezdek, O’Brien, & 
Wasson, 2012; Wright, Boyd, & Tredoux, 2003).  More specifically, numerous 
studies have documented the fact that overall discriminability (e.g., as measured 
  
72 
by d') is higher for same-race than cross-race faces, and various theoretical 
explanations have been advanced to explain that effect.  For example, some 
research has shown that the cross-race effect is reduced (Brigham, Maass, 
Snyder, & Spaulding, 1982; Carroo, 1986; Chiroro & Valentine, 1995) or even 
reversed (Sangrigoli, Pallier, Argenti, Ventureyra, & de Schonen, 2005) with 
more exposure to faces from different races.    
 Research on the cross-race effect has been cited by expert witnesses in 
courts of law for the past several decades as a reason to question the 
trustworthiness of cross-race eyewitness identifications.  Such testimony would 
appear to be supported not only by the research discussed above but also by 
expert consensus opinion. For example, in one survey of experts in eyewitness 
memory, the cross-race effect was described as follows: “eyewitnesses are more 
accurate when identifying members of their own race than members of other 
races” (Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, & Memon, 2001, p. 408).  Ninety percent of those 
surveyed indicated that the evidence bearing on this statement was reliable, and 
over 70% indicated that they would be willing to testify about it in a court of law.  
However, this statement does not clearly differentiate between overall memory 
being worse for someone of a different race (e.g., as measured by d') and the 
reliability of a cross-race identification (e.g., how accurate an ID made with high 
confidence is). Although the word "accuracy" is used to characterize both 
aspects of memory performance, they are not the same, and they are not equally 
important to the legal system. Here, we will use the word "accuracy" to refer to 
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the ability to distinguish between innocent and guilty suspects (typically 
measured by d') and "reliability" to refer to the probability that an identification 
made with a particular level of confidence is correct (Mickes, 2015). For an 
estimator variable, the legal system is primarily concerned with the reliability of 
an identification that has occurred, not with the overall ability to distinguish 
between innocent and guilty suspects. 
The eyewitness experts surveyed by Kassin, Tubb, Hosch, and Memon 
(2001) probably would not have considered the reliability of same- vs. cross-race 
identifications for different levels of confidence because 90% of them agreed that 
there was reliable evidence that an “eyewitness's confidence is not a good 
predictor of his or her identification accuracy” (p. 408). Recent evidence indicates 
that on an initial memory test using a properly administered lineup, confidence is 
an extremely good predictor of accuracy (Wixted et al., 2015; Wixted & Wells, 
2017). Indeed, it is theoretically possible that an estimator variable that impairs 
overall memory accuracy has that effect by shifting high-accuracy high-
confidence IDs to low-accuracy low-confidence IDs. Overall accuracy would be 
reduced (because of the increased proportion of low-accuracy low-confidence 
IDs) without necessarily changing the reliability of an ID made with a particular 
level of confidence. Measures that do not compute identification accuracy for 
each level of confidence and instead combine all identifications into a single 
number (e.g., d') cannot differentiate between factors that affect overall memory 
performance and factors that affect confidence-specific reliability. Does the 
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cross-race factor affect only affect overall accuracy (as much prior research has 
shown to be true), or does it also affect the reliability of IDs made with a 
particular level of confidence? That question is the focus of this article.  
Recent work suggests that the cross-race effect may be largely limited to 
overall accuracy, not to confidence-specific reliability. For example, in a 
reanalysis of several studies that investigated the cross-race effect using a list-
memory procedure, Nguyen, Pezdek and Wixted (in press) found that in three 
prior studies from the Pezdek lab for which overall performance was greater than 
chance, d' was greater for same- than cross-race faces (i.e., the typical cross-
race effect was found), but high-confidence same-race and cross-race 
identifications were nevertheless nearly equally reliable.  Similarly, using a photo 
lineup paradigm, Dodson and Dobolyi (2016) also found the typical cross-race 
effect (i.e., significantly higher d' for same- vs. cross-race IDs), but reliability as 
we have defined it here – that is, proportion correct as a function of confidence – 
was very similar for both conditions. In both conditions, high-confidence IDs were 
far more accurate than low-confidence IDs. By contrast, within each level of 
confidence, the difference in accuracy for same-vs.-cross-race IDs was small. 
For example, for IDs made with the lowest level of confidence, same-race 
accuracy was approximately 15% correct, whereas cross-race accuracy was 
approximately 11% correct. For IDs made with the highest level of confidence, 
same-race accuracy was approximately 80% correct, whereas cross-race 
accuracy was approximately 77% correct. Thus, in this study, as in Nguyen et al. 
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in press (in press), confidence provided a great deal of information about the 
reliability of an ID, where the same-vs.-cross-race variable provided a much 
smaller amount of information about the reliability of an ID. It seems fair to say 
that this is the opposite of what has long been thought to be true about the 
reliability of eyewitness identification.  
 In their lineup experiment, Dodson and Dobolyi (2016) measured the 
effect of the same-vs.-cross-race variable on calibration accuracy for “choosers.” 
Choosers are participants who identify someone from a lineup, whether the 
suspect (innocent or guilty) or a filler. The accuracy of choosers is of most 
importance to the legal system because eyewitnesses who do not choose 
someone from a lineup do not imperil any of the lineup members. Choosers, by 
contrast, sometimes choose an innocent suspect, which can result in a wrongful 
conviction. Thus, the performance of choosers has long been analyzed 
separately from non-choosers. However, the argument has recently been made 
that choosers who pick fillers also do not imperil a member of the lineup, so the 
question of most interest is suspect ID accuracy (Mickes, 2015). That is, the 
measure of most interest is the accuracy of participants who choose the suspect 
(innocent or guilty).  
The effect of the cross-race variable on the confidence-specific accuracy 
of suspect IDs has not been investigated, but we do so here. We report a new 
lineup experiment that investigates the effect of the cross-race variable on 
suspect ID accuracy for different levels of confidence, and we reanalyze the data 
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reported by Dodson and Dobolyi (2016) to determine what their lineup study 
indicates about the effect of same-vs.-cross-race on suspect ID accuracy.  
Method 
Participants 
UCSD undergraduate students participated online for course credit (N = 
1646; 464 male, 1172 female, 10 unspecified; average age = 20.5 years, sd = 
2.3).  At the end of the experiment, participants indicated their ethnicity.  There 
were 912 Asians (268 male, 640 female, 4 unspecified; average age = 20.3 
years, sd = 2.0) and 306 Caucasians (85 male, 219 female, 2 unspecified; 
average age = 21.0 years, sd = 2.4). 
Materials 
 Faces of 36 Asians with neutral expressions and 36 Caucasians with 
neutral expressions were used.  All faces had a white background.  A web-based 
version of Tetris was used for the distractor task. 
Procedure 
 The 36 Asian faces were randomly sorted into three groups of 12 faces.  
This random sorting was repeated three times, giving a total of nine different sets 
of 12 Asian faces.  This same procedure was also used for the Caucasian faces.   
 For each participant, one set of Asian faces and one set of Caucasian 
faces were randomly selected.  During the study phase one Asian face was 
randomly selected from the set and presented for 3 s, and one Caucasian face 
was randomly selected from the set and presented for 3 s.  The presentation 
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order of the two faces was also randomized.  Participants then had a 10-min 
distractor task, which was immediately followed by the test phase. 
 During the test phase, six of the Asian faces from the set were randomly 
presented in one simultaneous lineup along with a “Not Present” option.  Six of 
the Caucasian faces from the set were randomly presented in another lineup 
along with a “Not Present” option.  Randomly selecting six of the 12 faces gave a 
50% probability of having a target-present lineup and a 50% probability of having 
a target-absent lineup.  The order of the two lineups was also randomized.  
Participants could either select one of the faces or “Not Present” for each lineup.  
They then rated their confidence on a 0-100% scale (0 = guessing; 100% = 
certain). 
Results 
 For the general question of whether or not memory is worse for cross-race 
than same-race identifications, receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves 
were constructed.  An ROC curve measures discriminability, just as the more 
typical d' measure does, but it does so without relying on theoretical 
assumptions. The cross-race condition included all identifications made to a 
cross-race face (i.e., Caucasian participants viewing an Asian face and Asian 
participants viewing a Caucasian face).  The same-race condition included all 
identifications made to a same-race face (i.e., Caucasian participants viewing a 
Caucasian face and Asian participants viewing an Asian face).  As can be 
observed in the ROC curves shown in Figure 1, discriminability was higher for 
  
78 
same-race identifications than for cross-race identifications.  Using a false ID rate 
cutoff of .035,5 pAUC analysis revealed that the difference between the same-
race (0.022) and cross-race (0.018) groups was significant, D = 3.02, p = .003. 
Not surprisingly, the same result is obtained when we compute d' for the same-
race (3.27) and cross-race (2.88) conditions.  Thus, the oft-replicated cross-race 
effect was replicated again here. As noted earlier, however, that result does not, 
in and of itself, imply that the reliability of a cross-race ID differs from the 
reliability of a same-race ID.  Figure 2 shows the cross-race and same-race 
effect for the Caucasian and Asian faces separately, which shows the same 
pattern as the combined plots.  We plot the data by faces because this does not 
require any assumption that the face stimuli are perfectly equated in terms of 
memorability, whereas plotting the data by participant instead requires this 
assumption in order to be interpretable.     
 For the applied question of whether or not the same-vs.-cross-race 
variable affected suspect ID accuracy for different levels of confidence, we 
constructed CAC plots (see Mickes, 2015 for details).  The results are presented 
in Figure 3.  The first point to make about these results is that accuracy is fairly 
high even for low-confidence IDs. The usual pattern where accuracy becomes 
higher as confidence increases is also observed.  At the highest level of 
																																																						
5 This value was selected because it is the rightmost point on the ROC curve of 
the cross-race condition. Using the rightmost point on the ROC curve of the 
same-race condition does not change the conclusion (p < .001). 
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confidence, same- and cross-race identifications are virtually identical.  Figure 4 
shows the CAC plots for Caucasian and Asian faces separately, which shows the 
same general pattern as the combined plots. 
The CAC plots in Figure 3 assume equal base rates of target-present and 
target-absent lineups.  However, this number may be lower, which would lower 
the accuracy of positive identifications.  Wixted, Mickes, Dunn, Clark, and Wells 
(2016) estimated the actual base rate of target-present lineups to be 35%.  
Figure 5 shows the CAC plots for same- and cross-race identifications with a 
35% base rate (see Wixted and Wells, 2017 for details about calculations).   
Reanalysis of Dodson and Dobolyi’s (2016) Calibration Data. We 
contacted the authors of Dodson and Dobolyi (2016) about our interest in re-
plotting their data, and they kindly supplied their results plotted in terms of 
suspect ID accuracy.  Figure 6 shows their reanalyzed results.  Although 
accuracy covers a greater range in their study than in ours, the conclusion is 
similar: high-confidence suspect IDs are highly – and almost identically – 
accurate for same- and cross-race suspect IDs, but a small difference emerges 
for IDs made with lower levels of confidence.  
Discussion 
Extensive research has examined the cross-race effect and has 
consistently shown that memory is worse for cross-race than same-race 
identifications.  However, the question of most interest to the legal system – 
namely, are high-confidence cross-race identifications less reliable than high-
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confidence same-race identifications? – has been almost entirely ignored.  Here, 
we replicated the standard cross-race effect according to which overall memory 
is worse for cross-race identifications than same-race identifications.  
Nevertheless, our results show that high-confidence cross-race identifications are 
highly accurate and nearly as accurate as high-confidence same-race 
identifications.  This finding is true not only in our new data set comparing 
Caucasian and Asian faces but also in our reanalysis of the Dodson and Dobolyi 
(2016) data set comparing Caucasian and Black faces. In both studies, high-
confidence same-race and cross-race suspect IDs exceeded 97% correct.   
For decades, eyewitness memory researchers concluded there was little 
relationship between eyewitness confidence and accuracy (see Wixted, Mickes, 
Clark, Gronlund, & Roediger, 2015).  Wells and Murray (1984) concluded, “the 
eyewitness accuracy–confidence relationship is weak under good laboratory 
conditions and functionally useless in forensically representative settings” (p. 
165).  This belief likely lead eyewitness memory researchers to ignore the most 
forensically relevant question about cross-race identifications.  If researchers 
thought level of confidence did not provide any useful information, considering 
differences in high-confidence accuracy between conditions would be futile.  
However, eyewitness memory researchers now know that eyewitness confidence 
provides important information about the likely accuracy of an identification 
(Wixted & Wells, 2017).  This is clearly seen with cross-race identifications as 
well.  That is, on an initial and properly administered lineup, knowing the 
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eyewitness’s confidence level provides a lot of information about how likely the 
identification will be accurate, but knowing if the eyewitness is making a same-
race or cross-race identification provides very little information about 
identification accuracy (particularly for IDs made with high confidence, which are 
of most importance for cases that result in prosecution).   
The measure of overall recognition accuracy provides information about 
the theoretical question of which types of faces are better remembered but 
reveals little about the reliability of a high-confidence identification.  To date, most 
research on the cross-race effect has examined the question of whether memory 
is worse for cross-race than same-race faces.  This has resulted in numerous 
theories that explain the mechanism for reduced memory performance.  These 
theories explain why discriminability (d¢) is lower for cross-race than same-race 
identifications.  This, however, is not the most critical concern for the judicial 
system.  The judicial system is interested in knowing the accuracy of high-
confidence cross-race identifications.  In our research we replicate the standard 
cross-race effect where memory is worse for cross-race identification than for 
same-race identification.  However, our study also shows that high-confidence 
cross-race identifications are nearly as accurate as same-race identifications.  
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Figure 4.1.  Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) plots for same-race and 
cross-race identifications.   
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Figure 4.2.  Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) plots for same-race and 
cross-race identifications for Asian faces (Panel A) and Caucasian faces (Panel 
B). 
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Figure 4.3.  Confidence-accuracy characteristic (CAC) plots for same-race and 
cross-race identifications. 
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Figure 4.4.  Confidence-accuracy characteristic (CAC) plots of same-race and 
cross-race identifications for Asian faces (Panel A) and Caucasian faces (Panel 
B). 
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Figure 4.5.  Confidence-accuracy characteristic (CAC) plots for same-race and 
cross-race identifications if only 35% of lineups actually contain the perpetrator. 
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Figure 4.6. Confidence-accuracy characteristic (CAC) plots for same-race and 
cross-race identifications from the reanalyzed data from Dodson and Dobolyi 
(2016). 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
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 In this dissertation, I have examined how people differentiate between 
internal and external memory sources and discussed implications for real-world 
memory.  The work described in Chapter 2 provides new evidence supporting the 
contention of reality-monitoring theory that cognitive operations are important for 
knowing whether or not a memory comes from an internal source.  The work 
described in Chapter 3 shows how internally-generated information (verbal 
descriptions of a face) can be confused with an external memory source when 
the internally-generated information is not sufficiently detailed.  Finally, the work 
described in Chapter 4 shows that people can be good at judging the strength of 
their memory signal when deciding whether or not an identification should be 
made with high confidence even when discriminability is impaired (specifically, 
when recognizing cross-race faces).  In all of the chapters I have used signal 
detection theory to examine higher-level cognitive components that influence 
memory.   
As a research tool, signal detection theory can improve understanding of 
real-world memory by clarifying the components that are being examined.  
Different types of evidence values can help differentiate between internal and 
external memories and between external and new memories.  A key insight that 
signal detection theory provides is that the decision criterion can move in addition 
to the distributions of evidence values.  It is especially interesting to also 
understand that just because a signal detection statistic indicates that the 
decision criterion moves, this does not mean that the decision criterion has 
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actually moved.  As described next, this is one of the complications with 
calculating only signal detection parameters without fully understanding the 
underlying structure of the problem.   
Signal detection theory provides useful tools for measuring memory, but 
even more importantly than these tools is the way it allows a problem to be better 
understood at a conceptual level.  One frequent confusion with signal detection 
theory is that if a statistic measuring the criterion placement (e.g., c) changes, 
this automatically indicates that the criterion has been moved.  This confusion is 
noted in Chapter 2.  When only one distribution moves but all else remains 
constant (including the placement of the decision criterion), the statistic 
measuring criterion placement will change even if the criterion itself does not 
move at all.     
  In Chapter 2, this very phenomenon was observed in a study of reality 
monitoring and mindfulness meditation.  Reality monitoring is the process by 
which people determine if a memory is internally generated or actually 
encountered in the real world.  Mindfulness meditation provides a way of 
reducing cognitive operations so that researchers can observe its impact on 
internal and external memory sources.  A signal detection analysis indicated that 
mindfulness meditation affects only internal memories and not external 
memories.  The implication is that mindfulness meditation should not impair the 
ability to differentiate between two external memory sources but should be 
selective to situations where both internal and external memory signals can be 
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confused with each other.  This is the case in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott 
(DRM) paradigm and also the case in the reality-monitoring paradigm used in 
Experiment 3 of Chapter 2.   
Future research should examine the impact of mindfulness in other 
situations where confusions can occur between internal and external memory 
representations.  Some research suggests that mindfulness can improve memory 
(Brown, Goodman, Ryan, & Anālayo, 2016), and my research would not 
necessarily disagree with these conclusions.  The model proposed in Chapter 2 
indicates that discriminability should be lower after mindfulness meditation only in 
situations when internal information generated during encoding can be confused 
with external information.  In most situations, this is not a confusion that would 
likely be an issue for reducing discriminability.  For example, discriminating 
between a face seen during encoding and a new face presented during test (i.e., 
discriminating between two external sources of a memory) would unlikely be 
affected by mindfulness meditation.   
According to the account proposed in Chapter 2, discriminability would be 
lower as a result of mindfulness meditation only if a person internally imagined a 
face and then this internally-generated face appears on the test as a foil.  It is 
unlikely in most scenarios that an internally-generated face would happen to 
match a foil used in a lineup.  However, in the case of the verbal overshadowing 
effect examined in Chapter 3, internal and external confusions are possible 
because providing a verbal description of a face requires a person to internally 
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examine a mental image.  Examining this mental image can then result in 
internal-external confusion because the verbal description creates a new internal 
representation.  Future research should examine the effect of mindfulness 
meditation on verbal overshadowing because this is a situation where my 
account would predict that internal-external confusions are likely to occur.   
People may always have internal-external confusions after providing a 
verbal description of a face.  However, internal-external confusions are only 
problematic to the extent they contain differing information.  When the verbal 
description is given immediately after seeing the face, the internal description is 
sufficiently detailed for people to be able to later identify the perpetrator on a 
memory test.  However, when the verbal description is given after a delay, the 
internal description is no longer sufficiently detailed for people to be able to later 
identify the perpetrator on a memory test.   
Reality-monitoring theory proposes that “externally generated 
representations are more semantically detailed—that is, contain more information 
or more specific information—than internally generated representations” 
(Johnson & Raye, 1981, p. 71).  This greater detail helps people to later know 
that something was actually encountered in the real world rather than being 
internally generated.  As noted in Chapter 3, this difference in the level of detail 
between internal and external information can also explain why a verbal 
overshadowing effect is found when a verbal description is provided after a 20-
minute delay but not when a verbal description is provided immediately.  The 
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external information from the actual video has a high level of detail.  However, 
the internally-generated verbal information deteriorates as time elapses.  When 
this internally-generated verbal information no longer has the level of detail 
necessary to discriminate the guilty suspect from foils, performance on the 
memory test is lower.  This effect can be observed in the ROC data in Chapter 3. 
Chapters 2 and 3 both focus on the importance of being able to 
discriminate between internal and external sources of information.  However, it is 
usually just as important to be able to differentiate between different sources of 
external information.  The ability to make this discrimination involves being able 
to properly evaluate internal cues as to the strength of an externally created 
mental representation.  My research indicates that people can be quite good at 
being able to know if an internal strength cue is high or low.  One’s ability to be in 
tune with internal memory-strength information is revealed in the CAC plots for 
same-race and cross-race identifications in Chapter 4.  For both same-race and 
cross-race identifications, accuracy is higher for high-confidence identifications 
than for low-confidence identifications, and accuracy is essentially equally high 
for identifications made with high confidence.  If people did not have the ability to 
judge their internal strength cues, high-confidence accuracy would be reduced 
when discriminability is reduced (as it is in the cross-race condition).  Indeed, for 
decades, the field of eyewitness identification has mistakenly interpreted the 
lower discriminability associated with cross-race memory to mean that high-
  
98 
confidence cross-race IDs are less trustworthy than same-race IDs. Once 
properly examined, the data call that longstanding conclusion into question.  
In total my dissertation examines people’s abilities to attend to memory 
cues to be able to determine if something has actually been encountered in the 
real world.  This is often challenging, however, because both internally-generated 
and other externally-encountered information can closely resemble true 
memories for specific events.  The CAC curves in Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that 
people normally have a good ability to evaluate the strength of their memory 
cues.  People know when memory strength is high and when memory strength is 
low.  Future research should examine the exact mechanism by which people 
develop the ability to evaluate whether a particular memory is weak or strong.  
This process likely involves confirming and disconfirming feedback as to the 
accuracy of a particular memory decision (Mickes, Hwe, Wais, & Wixted, 2011). 
Adults seem to be naturally good at judging the strength of various 
memory cues.  One of the reasons people are naturally good at this is likely 
because people automatically categorize their experiences at the time they are 
being encountered or generated.  This categorization can then later help them to 
know more about the source of a memory above and beyond the information 
itself.  A primary goal of mindfulness meditation is to get people to avoid 
spontaneously categorizing and judging experiences.  This can improve well-
being as has been demonstrated in other research (Brown & Ryan, 2003).  
However, mindfulness meditation can also make it more difficult for people to 
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later know the source of memory information.  Specifically, mindfulness 
meditation can make it difficult for people to know that something that was 
internally generated was actually internally generated. 
My dissertation endeavored to enhance our understanding of how people 
judge internally-generated and externally-generated memories.  My work in 
Chapter 2 adds support for reality monitoring theory about the importance of 
cognitive operations for helping to identify internally-generated information as 
having been internally generated.  In Chapter 3, my research provides a new 
explanation for why a verbal overshadowing effect is observed after a delay but 
not when a verbal description is provided immediately after study.  This can be 
understood by considering differences in the level of detail between internal and 
external memory sources, which is a critical distinction in reality monitoring 
theory.  Chapter 4 corrects a misconception in the eyewitness memory literature 
by showing that even though discriminability is lower for cross-race identifications 
than for same-race identifications, high-confidence identifications are highly 
accurate for both.  My dissertation connects basic and applied memory research 
by using signal detection theory to examine memory in the real world.       
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